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ABSTRACT 
Development aid plays a significant role on the African continent in a number of 
ways which include, but is not limited to, financing budget deficits, conflict resolution 
and humanitarian assistance. South Africa, China, India and Brazil are among the 
“four main South powers” emerging on the global scene with aid policies designed at 
providing development aid to African Countries [Tjønneland, 2013: 1].  
This study has examined the establishment and implementation of the African 
Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund (ARF) by analysing the policy 
processes that led to its creation and operation, from 2000 to 2009. The principle 
behind the development of such an act was South Africa’s desire to show its 
commitment in assisting in resolving Africa’s socio-economic challenges that impede 
development in Africa. ARF has suffered inconsistency in policy making and 
implementation. The study has found that the challenges in ARF policy processes 
were attributed to governance issues, issues of accountability, temptation to be used 
as a state fund for political interest, weakness in the institutional framework, absence 
of autonomy in management, absence of monitoring and evaluation, political power 
and poor administration systems. 
Key words: Policy formulation, Policy adoption, Policy Implementation and 
Monitoring and evaluation. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Development aid plays a significant role on the African continent in a number of 
ways which include, but is not limited to, financing budget deficits, conflict resolution 
and humanitarian assistance. South Africa, China, India and Brazil are among the 
“four main South powers” emerging on the global scene with aid policies designed at 
providing development aid to African Countries [Tjønneland, 2013: 1]. Development 
aid policies have been debated by researchers, development agencies, 
governments, among others, not only in countries receiving aid, but also in countries 
providing aid. The development aid policy’s purpose, significance, relevance, 
intentions, feasibility, impact on development and influence on intergovernmental 
relations, to mention a few, are some of the areas of debate. South Africa is no 
exception to such rising debates, paving the way for scrutiny of its Development Aid 
policy. This research sought to examine the establishment and operation of the 
African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund (ARF) by analysing the 
policy processes that led to its creation and operation, from 2000 to 2009.  
The ARF bill repealed the previous Economic Co-operation Promotion Loan Fund 
Act, 1968 (Act No. 68 of 1968), as amended by the Economic Co-operation Loan 
Fund Amendment Act, 1986 (Act No. 29 of 1986) and the Economic Co-operation 
Promotion Loan Fund Amendment Act, 1998 (Act No. 16 of 1998) [DIRCO, 
2004].The current Act was established in terms of section 2(1) of Act 51 of 2000 and 
is called the African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund [Agency, 
2007]. It was published on 22 January 2001. It provides for the establishment of ARF 
for the purpose of enhancing integration and co-operation with and on the African 
Continent and to validate the Republic of South Africa’s commitment on the continent 
[Government Gazette, 2000].  
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1.2  BACKGROUND  
 
Public policy making debates in South Africa are characterised by intense processes 
with different parties contesting their polarised views, often drawn along their political 
affiliations. Coming up with an agreed-upon policy is frequently the result of an 
absence of a policy in public issues or protest against a lack of service delivery. The 
principle behind the development of such an act was South Africa’s desire to show 
its commitment in assisting in resolving Africa’s socio-economic challenges that 
impede development in Africa. 
Under DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Co-operation), an Act was 
created to assist the African continent. The Act was called the African Renaissance 
and International Co-operation Fund Act, 2000; this reaffirmed the Republic’s 
commitment to the concept of "African renaissance" which envisaged that African 
people and nations can overcome any challenges confronting the continent to 
achieve cultural, scientific, and economic renewal [Diop, 1996].   Through enhancing 
international co-operation on the African Continent, Mbeki saw the ARF as a step 
towards the vision (which was not a new phenomenon) which he publicised and 
supported. At its core, ARF was an economic and social development agenda for 
Africa. It was monitored and directed by the Department of International Relations 
and Co-operation [DIRCO]. 
The Fund’s mandate as stipulated in the Act [p. 5] was to develop co-operation 
between South Africa and other African countries through: 
1. promotion of democracy and good governance and the prevention and 
resolution of conflict; 
2. socio-economic development and integration; 
3. humanitarian and disaster relief in Africa and elsewhere in the world; 
4. technical assistance projects; 
5. capacity building, specifically in terms of human resource development, 
management training and student bursaries; and  
6. Projects relating to reaffirmation of South Africa’s commitment to relations 
with Africa. 
According to one analyst, the ARF administered some commendable interventions 
throughout Africa such as: agricultural projects in Zimbabwe, cultural projects in Mali, 
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humanitarian assistance in Somalia, water dams in Lesotho, peace processes in 
Burundi, the DRC and Comoros; election observer missions in Zimbabwe and public 
administration training in Sudan, among others [Besharati, 2013]. There was 
however administrative and structural challenges which compromised the 
effectiveness of ARF [Braude, Thandrayan, & Sidiropoulos, 2008] given also that 
“departments in South Africa could tap into the fund for nearly anything” without 
being accountable [Besharati, 2013]. This showed misconstrued objectives for the 
fund. 
Although the ARF Act was seen as a panacea to cure Africa through promoting 
development initiatives, there were flaws within the policy. For instance, other 
government departments, parastatals and non-governmental organisations provided 
support to their counterparts in other African countries and the fund’s development 
interventions were unclear and questionable [Besharati, 2013]. The above could be 
attributed to the lack of central control or records which should have been addressed 
by the ARF Act. 
 
Since 2007, discussions about co-ordinating and restructuring of South Africa’s 
development aid policy had been taking place to address the shortcomings of ARF. 
Hargovan [2012] suggested that this was going to be addressed through reviewing 
the ARF Bill and developing a strategic agency that could manage all South African 
outgoing development aid. Even though the policy review and discussions are 
currently on-going on replacing ARF with a new fund i.e. the South African 
Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), ARF has been designed and is intended 
to better define, measure, and co-ordinate development co-operation activities. 
1.2.  PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Both anecdotal evidence [for instance: Tapula, de Kock, & Sturman, 2011] and 
reliable research [for instance: Besharati, 2013] suggests that the development aid 
policy of South Africa was inconsistent, not well co-ordinated, lacked proper 
implementing mechanisms and often diverted from policy objectives. South Africa 
has over the years been engaging other countries on the African continent through 
its different development initiatives and mechanisms. However, institutional 
incapacities, inconsistent actions to policy, misappropriation of funds, lack of proper 
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co-ordination, unaccountability, to mention a few, suggest the ineffectiveness of the 
development policy of the Republic. 
As such, there is need for research on the South African government’s development 
and foreign aid policy by looking at the policy processes of the ARF Bill, tracing it 
from 2000 when deliberations on the envisaged bill started. This research was 
conducted in Pretoria. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
In light of the range of problems identified with South Africa’s development aid 
approach, the research explored the policy process relating to the establishment of 
the ARF bill from 2000to 2009 in order to determine its strengths and weaknesses in 
terms of output and impact. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The main research question was:  
What policy process was followed in the establishment of the ARF? 
The following sub-questions framed the scope of the research: 
1. How did ARF Act 2000 come into existence?  
2. How was the institutional framework enhanced by the new policy process? 
3. What were the new measures ensuring a credible and acceptable policy 
making process? 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE S TUDY  
The result of this study is intended to add knowledge regarding foreign policy 
decision making processes. It aims to assist in the development of strategic direction 
on how the South African government can improve policy making relating to its 
development aid approaches. 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATION  
Prior to the interviews, the researcher asked for permission from the relevant 
authorities to conduct research. Respondents were asked to read and sign a consent 
form for the nature of their participation. It was explained to the respondents that the 
research was for academic purposes and that their participation was voluntary and 
their identification would be kept confidential. 
The time and the scope of this research were limited to South African Department of 
International Relations and Co-operation Fund. The sample of this research involved 
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only the DIRCO policy makers, parliamentarians, minister in the presidency office 
and the South African president.  
THE RESEARCH OUTLINE OF CHAPTER ONE  
The research report contains the following chapters, provided with the summary: 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter provides an introduction to the study and presents the case study of the 
policy making process. The layout of the chapter starts by providing background, 
problem statement, purpose statement, and research question. At the end of this 
chapter, the structure of the entire research report is provided. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The literature review provides views of foreign policy of different continents and 
different countries. The focus on literature was to look at the way in which different 
countries conduct the policy making process. 
Chapter 3: Research Methodology  
In this chapter, methods  used to conduct the research were described. It provided 
the samples of data collection as presented from DIRCO. The study relied on the 
interviews and documentary research for the data collected. The researcher 
interviewed eight policy makers using a purposeful sample.  
Chapter 4: Data Presentation 
This chapter provided data presentation from ARF policy makers. Data and facts 
relating to the question of the research were categorized based on their 
characteristics. A summary of interviews was provided under the main themes using 
the exact quotes from the respondents.  
Chapter 5: Data Analysis and findings 
The chapter analyses the data that was presented in the previous chapter and in the 
literature review and what the policy makers said in context related to un- 
accountability, un-co-ordination and inconsistency of the policy making process in 
DIRCO. Themes for the analysis emerged during interviews and were used to group 
the findings for better analysis. 
Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations 
This chapter discussed the conclusion based on the knowledge gap, the views of the 
policy makers and views and the findings. The research gives recommendations to 
DIRCO policy makers. 
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CONCLUSION  
Chapter one has provided an introduction which outlined the developmental 
challenges on the African continent, the problem statement showed inconsistency in 
the policy making process while the purpose statement was to explore the policy 
making process of the ARF bill. The research question related to the challenges 
above asked how the ARF bill was established and finally, the chapter outline has 
been presented for the structure of the research. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this section is to unpack the emerging issues from previous research 
conducted elsewhere around which the topic has been mapped. This section 
critically looks at the foreign policy making process with regard to South Africa’s 
foreign aid policy, specifically the ARF. The main focus is on theories and the 
conceptual understanding of ARF policy making process and its approach in order to 
set both the broad context and the specific context of the study. This fosters 
understanding as it looks in more detail at the theory around the policy making 
process of foreign aid policy.  
In doing so, it follows an approach which broadly starts by giving a synopsis of public 
policy at definitional level, followed by an overview of foreign policy in order to 
position the study and finally  focuses on the development aid policy and the policy 
making process. Intense examination of foreign aid policy making process is done. 
The following schematic diagram gives an outline of the study.  
Figure 1: Outline of the research study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by author from Kaarbo [2002] 
 
Although this study does not cover public policy extensively, where necessary, 
reference is made taking into cognisance that foreign policy is a sub-domain of 
public policy. The literature review was selected in relation to the theory relevant to 
this study. This involved reviewing literature compiled by think tanks, professionals, 
and scholars that have done work in policy analysis, policy models and policy 
Public policy 
Foreign policy 
Foreign development aid 
policy 
 
Policy making 
process 
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process. As such, the literature reviewed for the study comprises peer reviewed 
journals, books and other scholarly publications extracted from the University of the 
Witwatersrand databases. 
The manner in which this discussion starts is by giving a brief insight into public 
policy, then an overview on policy analysis, followed by a brief description of policy 
models. We delve into a more detailed discussion on the policy process or cycle by 
looking at the stages involved. These are: problem identification, agenda setting, 
problem analysis, policy formulation, policy adoption, policy implementation and 
policy assessment. Going through these typically agreed upon policy process stages 
will allow for understanding of the policy processes being taken in the making of the 
ARF policy. 
 
2.1.  PUBLIC POLICY  
It is of importance to expand on what public policy is in order to understand South 
Africa’s development aid policy as it is part of foreign policy. Given the heated 
debates that come with policy making, it is not surprising that a generally accepted 
definition of public policy is elusive. Public policy can narrowly be construed as a 
course of action adopted and pursued by a government or a regulation by 
government to run government institutions. However, to fully understand what it is, 
involves unpacking what “public” and “policy” in public policy means. 
Policy is defined as a social science regulation using methods of enquiry and an 
opinion, to create, and convert policy related information used in the political 
environment to solve policy problems [Dunn, 1994]. As such, it can be concluded 
that policy works for those who make it and for those who participate in its 
application as a defence or as a standard of making things happen while guiding 
actions towards the achievement of desired outcomes. The term “public” is simplified 
by Colebatch [2002] to mean “of the people”. On the other hand, Van Nieuwkerk 
[2006] refers to public policy as a choice among several alternatives. 
 
In view of the above mentioned definitions, and for the purposes of this study, a 
more comprehensive definition of Public Policy is derived from Anderson [2003] who 
defines it as a stable, purposive course of action followed by an player or set of 
players in dealing with a problem created as a response to a perceived problem of a 
constituency, formulated by a specific political process, and adopted, implemented, 
 9 
 
and enforced by the state. Therefore, public policy can be viewed as an attempt by 
government to remedy a public problem by instituting laws, regulations, or actions 
aimed at addressing the issue. 
Public policy as shown in Figure 2, can be divided into two broad areas: domestic 
policy and foreign policy [Kaarbo, et al, 2002].  
 
Figure 2: Boundary of reference 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by author from Kaarbo [2002] 
 
 
 2.2.  SCOPE OF THE STUDY   
The foreign aid policy is formed to achieve some of the foreign policy objectives. 
Domestic policy is defined as policies that work within the country’s boundaries; 
whereas foreign policy refers to policies that address issues outside the country’s 
boundaries [Kaarbo, et al, 2002]. However, there is a nexus between domestic policy 
and foreign policy as each influences the other and more interestingly, one country’s 
domestic policy might be the trigger for another country’s foreign policy, a good 
example is taken from the United States (US) case and China where US safety 
standards for food are aimed at improving the health of the US citizens. On the other 
hand, this also shaped the amount and type of food for the exporting countries like 
China. The domestic policy was aimed at improving the food internally; however, this 
has adversely affected China’s exports and in the end, China had to abide to the 
“domestic” policy of the US [Kaarbo, et al, 2002]. 
Foreign policy of one country is likely to attract interest from another country, quite 
often with suspicion and scepticism [Moss, 2004]. In an effort to curb this, there has 
been a shift in foreign policy approaches towards foreign aid policy as an instrument 
to achieve overall foreign policy objectives [Baehr, 1997].Therefore, the following 
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discussion positions foreign aid policy as a sub-domain of foreign policy [Kaarbo, et 
al, 2002]. 
 
2.3.  FOREIGN POLICY  
Van Nieuwkerk [2006] argues that foreign policy is seen as actions and plans of a 
national Government in the direction of its external environment. On the other hand, 
Onuki, [2009:136) defines foreign policy as “international treaties and agreements 
signed with foreign countries and international organizations, trade policy, direct 
actions on international matters, instrument referent to the functioning of the ministry 
of foreign affairs (MRE), diplomatic representations and national defence issues”, 
while Thipanyane [2011] defines foreign policy as a closer relationship and 
collaboration with international leaders in pursuit of influence on the continent, 
geopolitics, trade and international relations. The definitions above provide 
understanding of foreign policy in pursuit of collaborations with foreign countries to 
achieve international trade. Below is a brief background of South African foreign 
policy under different leaders from post-apartheid to the current situation. 
 
2.3.1.  SOUTH AFRICA ’S STATE OF AFFAIRS POST 1994  TO CURRENT  
 
(a) Foreign policy process under Mandela 
The following table shows a number of organisations that formed co-operation 
agreements with the ANC before a democratic government took over in 1994. 
Certain agreements were made by the ANC and a number of organisations joined 
forces in support of the transition from the apartheid government to a democratic 
government. The table below shows associations from 1984 to 1994 who 
contributed to the transition. 
Table1.  Source: Sahistory [2014]. 
1984 United Nations General assembly rejects and 
considers the new SA constitution 
1985 PW Botha PW Botha offers Nelson Mandela 
conditional release from prison 
1986 Anti Apartheid Act The Comprehensive Anti Apartheid 
Act is passed in the United States 
(US) after Congress overrides 
president Ronald Reagan’s veto on 
the legislation. 
1987 FEDSAW Members of the Federation of 
South African Women (FEDSAW) 
fly to Lusaka to meet with the ANC 
for negotiations related to Nelson 
Mandela. 
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1988 Transkei Democratic Progressive 
Party 
Members of Transkei’s Democratic 
Progressive Party meet the ANC. 
1989 UDF and COSATU January, A joint delegation of UDF 
and COSATU goes to Lusaka for 
further consultations with the ANC. 
1990 FW De Klerk Announces the unbanning of the 
ANC and other banned liberation 
movements, and the release of 
Nelson Mandela 
1991 NPA The National Peace Accord is 
signed by leaders of various 
political organisations to bring an 
end to the violence. This is the first 
multi-party agreement. 
1992 ANC, SACP and COSATU August, The ANC, SACP and 
COSATU join forces to organise a 
massive campaign of mass action 
against the government involving 
rallies and a two day general strike. 
1993 ANC and SA government The ANC and the South African 
government agree to resume 
multiparty talks but both parties 
want input in the creation of a new 
negotiation forum. 
 
With the transition to a democratic government in 1994, co-operation increased. 
Agreements on development co-operation were concluded between South Africa 
and other organisations [Herbert, 2012]. After the fall of apartheid in 1994, South 
Africa issued a white paper for a reconstruction and development programme (RDP) 
for tackling apartheid’s legacy of poverty and inequality. Mandela, in his term of 
office, was obliged to accept the terms and conditions of the constitutional settlement 
to form a government of national unity (GNU) [Barber, 2005]. This was done to 
protect the new ruling party (the ANC) from their lack of experience in government. 
Though the ANC lacked governing experience, it succeeded in transforming itself 
from a liberation movement into a political party which led to a government [Barber, 
2005]. Because South Africa regarded itself as a “giant” of Africa, the new 
government focused its priority on the African continent. On the other hand, the 
western governments were frustrated that they could not solve the problems in 
Africa; as a result, they saw South Africa as a ”hope” to resolve political challenges 
in Africa. South Africa built partnerships with the AU and SADC. 
The transformation of the South African foreign policy process during this time was 
aimed at altering political values from post-apartheid to ANC political values 
[Mandela, 1993].  These values were based on human rights, democracy and 
majority rule [Van Nieuwkerk, 2006]. During Mandela’s government, human rights 
and democracy were pivotal to SA foreign relations. Van Nieuwkerk [2006] argues 
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that the human rights focus under the “new democratic government” was to advance 
the rights of the citizens. In 1993, in his speech, Mandela indicated that human rights 
would be the driving force behind the SA foreign policy [Mandela, 2003]. The 
struggle against apartheid contributed to Mandela's boldness on the relationship 
between human rights and foreign policy [Thipanyane, 2011]. The table below 
stipulates the values on which South African foreign policy was founded and its 
democracy [RSA, 1996]. The beliefs below were set to influence South African 
foreign policy in pursuit of its newly elected democratic government. 
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Table1. Source: Mandela [1993]. Pillars of South Africa foreign policy  
 
   Source: (Van Nieuwkerk, 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Law, 1996) 
 
The above beliefs were set to influence South African foreign policy in pursuit of its 
new foreign policy. 
 
(b)  Foreign policy under Mbeki and the African Renaissance 1999 -2007 
At the end of Mandela’s presidency, Thabo Mbeki took over. He was described as an 
enigmatic character compared to the charismatic Mandela (Thipanyane, 2011). 
Before Mandela finished his term, he admitted that Mbeki was the “de facto ruler”  
 
and proclaimed that Mbeki brought a distinctive feature to foreign policy-making. 
Barber [2005] argues that Mbeki stood for three core elements: “democratic, 
Africanist and anti-imperialist”. President Mbeki articulated a strong commitment to 
assisting in the revival and renewal of the African continent through the “African 
Renaissance” concept [Van Nieuwkerk, 2006]. This was done by championing the 
“roots” of developing countries on the continent through the South African 
government’s leadership in multilateral institutions. One example is where South 
Africa contributed to the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 
2002 and the fact that SA plays an imported role in United Nations agencies and it is 
the driving force behind NEPAD initiatives [Ajulu, 2000].  
Mbeki identified himself as an “African" in his speech [Mbeki, 2012]. Furthermore, he 
called for an African renaissance. With his passion for Africa, he aimed to fight a war 
against “poverty, ignorance and backwardness” on the continent [Barber, 2005]. His 
commitment to Africa has never faltered, and, despite many challenges on the 
continent, he is described as a hard worker with determination and a vision for Africa 
[Barber, 2005]. During his term of office, he formed a new economic framework for 
Africa’s development (NEPAD) with the intention of the eradication of poverty, 
sustainable growth and integration of Africa into the global economy [Barber, 2005]. 
 That issues of human rights are central to international relations 
and an understanding that they extend beyond the political, 
embracing the economic, social and environmental; 
 That just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can 
only come through the promotion of democracy worldwide; 
 That considerations of justice and respect for international law 
should guide the relations between nations; 
 That peace is the goal for which all nations should strive, and 
where this breaks down, internationally agreed and nonviolent 
mechanisms, including effective arms-control regimes, must be 
employed; 
 That the concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should 
be reflected in our foreign policy choices; 
 That economic development depends on growing regional and 
international economic cooperation in an interdependent world. 
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NEPAD was welcomed by the US and EU and they agreed on an action plan for 
Africa. 
Van Nieuwkerk [2006] argues that South African foreign policy after 1994 can be 
portrayed as vacillating between “realist” and “moral” internationalism. Further, he 
asserts that a palpable tension between the priority of its perceived commercial 
trade, political interest and its role as a moral crusader in the promotion of global 
human rights and democracy was always an issue [Van Nieuwkerk, 2006]. 
Conversely, the second term of political shift in foreign policy making under Thabo 
Mbeki secured an overwhelming political stability. Thabo Mbeki’s government 
showed confidence, rationale and vision in foreign policy.  
The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) reformulated the mission statement of 
South Africa’s foreign affairs when Mbeki took over. As such, promotion of “security 
and wealth creation” was the fundamental purpose. This was enhanced by 
promoting compliance with international law and involvement in conflict prevention, 
resolution and management [Van Nieuwkerk, 2006]. In addition, the creation of 
wealth was managed through a balanced and co-ordinated mechanism to the 
globalised environment. However, Mbeki’s future was at stake during the Polokwane 
conference when he was surprisingly recalled by his own political party, the ANC 
[Landsberg, 2012]. His successor, Zuma, received overwhelming support from the 
ANC 2007 Polokwane conference and Mbeki had to step down.  
 
(c) Foreign policy under Zuma 2007 – 2014 
South Africa’s foreign policy during Mbeki’s time could have been influenced by 
issues raised by the Polokwane conference. This was the result of tensions between 
Mbeki and Zuma [Landsberg, 2012]). This had an effect on the on-going foreign 
policy under Zuma.  “Many of the expectations have revolved around the idea that 
the democratic coup would constitute not just a shift in personalities but in actual 
policies” [Landsberg 2011:246]. From 2009, when President Zuma took over, South 
Africa's foreign policy has been influenced heavily by domestic socio-economic 
challenges [Reardon, 2012]. President Zuma has tried to create jobs by partnering 
with Brazil and China and hoped that the business relationships would curb the 
socio-economic challenges in SA [Reardon, 2012]. Since 1994’s election under the 
post-apartheid government, South Africa's foreign policy has been supporting 
development and stability in the African continent [Reardon, 2012]. Two years after 
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Zuma had taken over from Mbeki; there were concerns and questions about the 
influence of human rights in the foreign policy and international relations of Zuma’s 
government [Thipanyane, 2011]. During this time, perceptions arose that Zuma’s 
government was moving away from the foreign policy initiated by Mandela and 
Mbeki [Thipanyane, 2011]. As such, Zuma’s speech delivered on the 13 October 
2011 did not mention the importance of human rights [Sidiropoulos, 2009]. This 
resulted in international countries doubting SA’s capability to recover its standing in 
the global sector [Thipanyane, 2011]. Some of the issues that made international 
countries doubt Zuma’s foreign policy directions are, to name a few: 
 “South Africa’s stand on the African Union’s (AU) refusal to co-operate with 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) in its actions against a few African 
leaders, such as Bashir of Sudan;  
 South Africa’s international human rights treaty reporting obligations and 
ratifications; and South Africa’s position in the UN Security Council in relation 
to Libya and Syria”  [Thipanyane 2011:13].  
2.3.2.  SOUTH-  SOUTH COOPERATION  
The history of South-South co-operation relates back to 1955 to a conference held in 
Bandung [Poon, 2013]. The large developing countries who are the major players in 
the global world have brought South-South co-operation to the centre-stage [OECD, 
2012]. South-South co-operation has been active since the 1960s and 1970s. 
However, not much progress has been achieved due to lack of resources, post-
colonial restructuring, institutional weaknesses, and poor communication in 
developing countries [Sotero, 2009]. On the 6th June 2003, IBSA (India, Brazil and 
South Africa) was established. The new partnership (IBSA) revitalised the spirit of 
South-South co-operation. The three countries share elements of common economic 
and political history [Sotero, 2009]. The intent of this co-operation was to deliver 
expertise and financial support for economic and social welfare for other developing 
countries [OECD, 2012]. On the other hand, IBSA’s approach was to provide a forum 
for consultation and co-ordination on significant political issues [Barber, 2005]. A 
good example is the reform of the United Nations (UN), its Security Council and 
negotiations at the World Trade Organization [Sotero, 2009]. The framework for SA 
foreign policy is predicated on an “Afrocentric” strategic perspective that reflects 
agendas for Africa [Sotero, 2009]. The African Agenda includes the Southern Africa 
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region with SADC, the Southern African Development Community. Furthermore 
development co-operation is expected to bring solidarity among developing countries 
and collective self-reliance to address the common challenges amongst the 
countries involved. At the present time, South Africa has worked to transform its 
foreign assistance to promote a positive social and economic change across the 
continent. As a result, in 2001, the African Renaissance and International Co-
operation Fund (ARF) was formed under the Foreign Affairs Department [Reardon, 
2012]. This was done to replace the apartheid-era bureaucracy and the development 
assistance programme. The driving force behind the African Renaissance was 
Mbeki. He (Mbeki) believed that SA could lead the renaissance through initiatives for 
African development such as the AU (African Union) to promote socio-economic 
development on the continent [Reardon, 2012]. As such, SA development is also 
used as a tool to influence the African continent [Reardon, 2012].  The foreign 
development programs are promoted to build South-South co-operation. Funds from 
ARF are delivered through multilateral agencies like SADC, the AU and Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) [Reardon, 2012].   An example of this program was 
funding Seychelles for infrastructure rehabilitation and Republic of Guinea to boost 
rice production [Reardon, 2012].   
Therefore, the role of ARF was to consolidate the African and South agendas, and 
introduce to South African politics a real public diplomatic thrust [Edigheji, 2007].  But 
the challenge of South Africa and its ANC government is to address the contradictory 
ideological strands in foreign policy [Edigheji, 2007]. Therefore, the goal for the 
African renaissance is to achieve a stable and sustainable peace in Africa [OECD, 
2012].  Furthermore, the “African agenda” must be built into a strong policy to defend 
its regional integration and development. Moreover, the political objective for South 
Africa is to support and develop South Africa’s political role as a stabilising factor in 
the region, the continent and beyond, while the role for development is reducing 
poverty and inequality by promoting internal social stability [Edigheji, 2007]. 
 
2.4.  DEVELOPMENT AID POLICY  
Development aid policy is referred to as development co-operation in some sections 
of literature [see for instance: Alonso, 2012; Hargovan, 2012]. It is defined as “the 
co-operation between developing and developed countries in the field of aid, trade, 
security and politics to promote economic and social well-being in developing 
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countries” [Hargovan 2012:4]. Different countries and global institutions have 
development aid policies for a variety of reasons as listed in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: The Rationale of Development Aid Policy 
Political/Strategic Economic/Commercial Ethical/Humanitarian 
 Instrument of domination 
 Combating terrorism/drugs 
 Influence in international 
situations 
 Access to local authorities 
 Friendships/neighbours 
 Landing rights/access to 
ports and points of entry 
 Export promotion 
 Anti-cyclical instrument 
(combat recessions) 
 Promotion of investments 
(risk mitigation) 
 Access to primary 
products/minerals 
 Feed and house  
 Solidarity after natural 
disasters 
 Promotion of peace, 
human rights and 
entitlements 
 Assisting Refugees 
Source: Hargovan [2012:7] 
 
The above do not exhaust the reasons why development aid policies exist, but they 
provide an insight. 
 
2.5.  SOUTH AFRICA ’S DEVELOPMENT AID POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE  
South Africa’s international co-operation programmes in 2012 included: African 
Renaissance Fund, Programmes at National, Provincial and Local level, India-Brazil-
South Africa (IBSA) Poverty Alleviation Fund, Multilateral programmes through 
concessional lending institutions such as African Development Bank (AFDB) and 
World Bank (WB), Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Agreements on revenue 
sharing [Hargovan, 2012]. Besharati [2013], however, suggested that, although the 
variety of development co-operation activities which are being run and provided by 
various institutions, agencies and stakeholders in South Africa are commendable, 
there are policy challenges in defining, measuring, and co-ordinating them. 
 
2.6.  POLICY ANALYSIS  
Policy analysis is defined by Smith [2007] as fundamentals of value judgments, 
beliefs, relations, multi-disciplinary applications and the importance of its process. 
Furthermore, policy analysis is seen as entailing a range of activity on a spectrum of 
knowledge in policy process [Van Nieuwkerk, 2006]. The analysis of policy in 
government relates to what is perceived as the community’s views in the form of 
government regulations which are placed in a bureaucratic process. In relation to the 
analysis of the process, literature stresses the importance of a system’s capacity and 
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its good governance to be put as priority in the success of the policy process [Dun, 
1994; Smith, 1997].  
2.7.  POLICY MODEL  
Policy models represent the features of particular policy alternatives or paths 
selected in the creation of guidelines or policies to address problems for particular 
reasons [Dunn, 1994]. These models are formed to analyse the process of decision 
making in a particular format. The models include the Elite model, Systems model, 
Institutional model and Group model, among others [Smith, 1997]. Scholars in public 
policy often use a model that is practical to apply in a particular policy. The table 
below provides different models from different authors. 
The diagram of each model that could be used in the analysis of policy making 
process is provided below. An example of a content model like a rational model 
unpacks the content of the policy options, its output and effects. These models are 
utilised in the making of a policy and could be used in analysis of an act as well [Dye, 
1995; De Coning, 2000], while process models like systems models are used in 
analysing the policy processes as well as the stakeholders involved in the process. 
On the other hand, functional models are used in the functional stages of the policy 
decision making process [Dunn, 1994]. For the purpose of this study, Dunn’s [1994] 
Process model will be utilised to assist in the analysis of the policy decision making 
processes followed in the crafting of the ARF Act. This model focuses on the 
generally acceptable policy processes in policy making.  
Table: 2. Classified policy models 
Content Model Process Model Functional Models 
Rational Systems 
Dunn's policy analysis model Dunn 
[1994] 
Incremental Institutional Patton & Sawicki [1993] 
Mixed Scanning Public Choice Mutuhaba, et  al [1993] 
Normative-
Optimum model 
Power - 
centred: 
Bureaucratic 
politics  
Group/Pluralist,  
Elite, Marxist 
and Corporatist 
Wissink's [1991] stage model 
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2.8.  POLICY PROCESS  
The process model is generally perceived as the ideal policy process [Tosun, 2008]. 
One can view the policy process as a series of political activities of: identifying 
problems or setting the agenda for decision making; analysing the problem or 
formulating policy proposals (options); adopting a policy alternative or political 
mandate; implementing policies; and evaluating policies. Bridgman [2003] argues 
that the approach in which the public policy is established, and sufficient attention to 
pressures which made the policy to be put in place, must be given attention to issues 
decided through political rather than bureaucratic process. This process involves 
individuals, institutions and agencies to make it an effective process [Shepherd, 
2011]. Furthermore, policy decisions are not independent of decisions taken before; 
rather current policies have effects on the past and future policies. For the policy 
process to run smoothly during the public policy making process, enough experts 
with knowledge must be consulted and more effective consultation during the 
decision making process is important. A typical policy process below is provided: 
Fig 3:  Adopted from Dunn [1994] 
 
 
2.9.  POLICY DIALOGUE OR CONSULTATION  
Stakeholders in policy making must be mindful of the divergent goals, thoughts, 
motivations and personalities involved when undertaking consultation processes 
[Freeman, 2013]. In addition, consultation “….tests opinions and wins support” 
Identifying 
the 
problem/set
ting the 
agenda 
Analyse the 
problem/for
mulating 
policy 
options 
 
Policy 
adoption/ 
political 
mandate 
Policy 
Implementa
tion 
Monitoring 
and 
Evaluations 
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[Bridgman 2003:101]. It is key to a successful policy implementation [Althaus, et al. 
2013]. It plays a role as part of allowing different opinions to reach consensus in 
policy decision, as [Freeman 2013:10] puts it “.....Consultation promotes consensus 
about policy choices...” At the end, it “provides proposals and evidence around which 
politics gel” [Bridgman, 2003]. In general, it improves the quality of the policy 
decisions through access to information and perspective [Freeman, 2013]. Weible, et 
al. [2012] highlights four characteristics that the stakeholders in policy making must 
have: 
First, they must be goal oriented; second, they must be capacitated to process 
various motivations supplied by the policy environment; third, they must efficiently 
simplify, understand, interpret and respond clearly to incoming inputs and last, they 
must have no fear and trust in reasoning, allocating awareness, and making 
behavioural conclusions. In the same vein, there must be co-ordination in the making 
of the policy. By co-ordination, Shepherd [2011] argues that better co-ordination in 
policy must contain three elements; i.e. strategic control from the centre of 
government, ministries with capacity for co-ordination and lastly, there must be a 
mechanism for a parallel co-ordination.  
The absences in these elements lead to poor monitoring and evaluation in policy 
implementation. As such, where performance is strong, it is possible to achieve 
effective co-ordination and evaluation.  However, governments in countries have 
experienced growth in government institutions during the time of globalization. As a 
result, two problems have been identified that could impede effective performance in 
policy such as the growing size and complexity of government and coherence and 
control in policy [Shepherd, 2011]. These issues may contribute to failure in policy 
evaluation. As such, full capacity in government institutions must be exercised to 
prevent overwhelming governance in weak institutions. The first stages in policy 
decision making process, as illustrated in Fig 3, is discussed below. 
2.9.1.  IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM/  SETTING THE AGENDA  
The aim of this section is to test aspects of the theory in establishing an agenda. 
Agenda setting is defined as “a list of subjects or problems that government people 
and other stakeholders paying serious attention within a specific time” [Eustis 2000: 
2], in other words, the list of issues or problems, government and other private 
partnerships take into account to form an agenda in the policy process. This stage of 
 21 
 
policy refers to identification of the public problem which requires the state to 
intervene [Tosun, 2008]. While Freeman [2013] refers to this stage as an intelligence 
gathering and co-ordination phase, stakeholders in setting an agenda could have 
their own interests. In this regard, the study stresses the importance of stakeholders 
having a mutual agenda when attending to the policy process. Dunn [1994] and Dye 
[2007] agree that a mutual agreement has to be met and that setting of an agenda 
precedes the process of making a policy. If this is not the case, the stakeholders may 
try to push their own agenda [Eustis 2000]. 
A number of issues in the environment can influence the agenda of decision makers. 
It is argued that issues reaching the attention of decision makers affect the social 
construction of reality, where perceptions overwhelm reality [Barkenbus, 1998]. As 
such, media encourages this act. Certain actors will inform developers of the public 
policy, including public officials, mass media, interest groups and bureaucracy, the 
president, parliament, the ministries and courts [Tosun, 2008].  These actors also 
contribute in bringing issues to the agenda. 
Moreover, the president’s office is likely to get the main issues because of its high 
office. In support, Schnapps [2000] argues that it is an effective matter for the policy 
agenda setters as it clearly identifies circumstances when bureaucratic proposals will 
influence political process in decision making [Tosun, 2008]. Therefore, the success 
of policy depends on sound evidence of the policy development, policy drawn based 
on political context and focusing on delivery from the outset [Halsworth, 2011].  
 
2.9.2.  ANALYSING THE PROBLEM AND POLICY FORMULATION  
Formulation of policy may be defined by the definition of the problem and 
acceptance of feasible courses of action for handling policy problems [Tosun, 2008]. 
It involves three activities where relevant data and information is collected, objectives 
explained and determined with important inquiries and alternatives are established 
[Manitoba, 2003]. The emphasis is that at this stage many options of policies are 
invited and reviewed by the policy committee. In agreement, Tosun [2008] states that 
formulation of policy deals directly with the elaboration of alternative courses of 
action. However, this is not a smooth process; the committee still has to choose the 
best alternative from many. The clarity of intended policy objectives decides on the 
achievement of the committee to filter the policy review and ideas from the public or 
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ministerial branch through co-ordination and meetings with other interested parties 
are needed to create a healthy policy proposal. This decision is supported by the 
main policy question and purposes of interpretation to build on the policy confidence. 
When there is confidence, the next policy stage evolves. Smith [1997] suggests that 
role players must debate and confirm the accuracy of the final policy document. On 
the other hand, policies must be easy to implement with no complexities. Halsworth 
[2011:14] argues that “policies must be brought closer to the real world and the real 
world closer to the policy process”.  
Regardless of how the issue reached the public agenda; the experts are part of its 
resolution [Barkenbus, 1998]. The expert’s knowledge in decision making is more 
important than political members. However, political members should bend to 
intelligence, wisdom, and the reasoning that experts possess [Barkenbus, 1998]. 
The knowledge and qualities of experts in policy formulation provide opportunities 
that enlighten decision making [Barkenbus, 1998]. When experts are absent, 
decision makers could formulate policy options based on their influential powers and 
specific interests. Moreover, their perspective on the “issue” may be shaped by this 
basis [Barkenbus, 1998]. This could lead to limiting policy alternatives, while the 
enlightenment value of expert knowledge increases policy space and enhances 
potential formulation of a win-win policy situation [Barkenbus, 1998]. On the other 
hand, if the decision maker is from an elected government office, his role is to bring 
unlimited knowledge to the context in which they are operating, unlike the experts in 
policy who are unaware of the context. The state’s “coordinative mechanisms are 
needed to overcome fragmentation, to aggregate interests, to cope with complexity, 
and to take longer and broader perspectives on issues” [Barkenbus 1998:6].  
2.9.3.  POLITICAL MANDATE/POLICY ADOPTION  
Policy adoption is one of the important stages in the policy process. The committee 
must show confidence in the White Paper in order to convince budget allocation. In 
addition, the condition of the budget puts more weight in the cabinet meeting 
[Subroto, 2011]. The lower the budget, the lower the positive gesture in cabinet 
meetings for policy adoption [Subroto, 2011]. In the end, the ability of the executive 
team raises confidence in the implementation of the policy, the more capable the 
team, the higher the confidence on policy application [Subroto 2011:19]. Before the 
policy is adopted, costs and benefits of the proposed policy will influence the 
 23 
 
adoption of the policy [Tosun, 2008]. In order for the policy adoption stage to run 
smoothly, there must be a clear and constant consultation for alternatives and 
criteria of the agenda to ensure understanding, acceptance and legitimacy of the 
proposed policies [Feeman, 2013].  
2.9.4.  POLICY IMPLEMENTATION  
Policy frameworks provide much needed insight and clarity into the process that 
individuals face and policy regulations [Dunn, 1994]. Also there is “appropriation” of 
policy which is possibly action oriented and not static. Manitoba [2003] highlights the 
dynamics and the possibility that individual experience and situational expertise can 
be used to inform and create effective policy implementation. However, the literature 
on policy implementation assumes that individual actors, such as policymakers, must 
logically make logical choices within constraints to obtain the results they desire 
[Smith, 1997]. On the other hand, Anderson [2003] suggests that individual actor’s 
with the capacity and access to knowledge, time, attention, and other resources in 
real-world settings are able to act logically in policy implementation. 
Implementation involves financial capacity in policy and includes good leadership in 
putting the policy into action [Smith, 1997]. Therefore, the policy framework is 
expected to be action oriented in guiding policymakers and implementers as they 
engage in the complex process of policy implementation. Furthermore, Geoffrey 
[2011] describes the implementation programme as a “quasi” system. He claims that 
politicians can easily influence civil servants when they implement public policy 
[Geoffrey, 2011]. Therefore, an independent system where civil servants are not 
influenced by politicians and apply their own minds to what the policy requires them 
to do could improve the efficient intent of the policy. Hallsworth [2011] laments that 
people implementing a policy need the capacity and opportunity to adapt.Thus,good 
policy implementation is a combination of presenting a vision, setting strategic 
objectives and realistic implementation plans. Freeman [2013] argues that good 
policies are worthless unless properly implemented. Meanwhile, Barkenbus [1998] 
argues that policies are not self-executing.  The challenge is left with those who have 
to implement the policy. In support, Tosun [2008] argues that “policy without proper 
implementation has neither substance nor significance”, while, Barkenbus [1998] 
comments that implementation is so difficult to an extent that it would be surprising to 
see any positive accomplishment made by the policy itself [Barkenbus, 1998]. Tosun 
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[2008] and Barkenbus [1998] agreed that success on implementation of policy 
depends on how well bureaucratic structures implement goverment laws. As such, 
practical skills do not come easily on putting the policy into action. In addition, those 
who are administrators of policy are charged with the responsibility of carrying out 
the dictates of policy [Barkenbus, 1998]. Furthermore, practical mechanisms play a 
crucial role in the policy decision making process. A good example is the Food 
Quality Protection Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act [Barkenbus, 1998]. There are 
no accurate mechanisms to prove how safe the protection act is and how clean the 
water is. However, the more quantitative the determinations are the easier 
implementation plans will be for transparency and predictability [Barkenbus, 1998]. A 
good example to measure the quality of safety and cleanliness is the “Science 
Advisory Board” (SAB) that evaluates implementation standards. It can be said that 
policies are not “self-executing”, forces like courts, political pressure and interests 
group can influence the efficiency in policy implementation [Barkenbus, 1998]. 
Technical assistance from advisors of policy makers will play a large role in putting 
the policy into action. In the end, an institution with sufficient resources is able to 
translate policy objectives into an operational framework and is accountable for its 
actions [Gerston, 2004, cited by Tosun, 2008]. 
 
2.9.5  ACCOUNTABILITY  
Government institutions have a responsibility to introduce order where appropriate 
and holding implementers to account when something goes wrong [Halsworth, 
2011].Transparency throughout the policy making process is crucial. Anticipation of 
challenges in the decision making process must provide transparency, accountability 
and opportunities for involvement [Freeman, 2013]. 
 
2.9.6.  POLICY EVALUATION  
This stage in much of the reviewed literature comes right at the end when all the 
policy process stages have taken place. According to Subroto [2011], this stage 
leads to the policy revision. After policy has been implemented, it becomes the 
subject of evaluation [Tosun, 2008]. In this case, the outcome of the implementation 
will either be positive or negative. The main goal is to assess if the policy objectives 
have been followed and achieved. On the other hand, the public will provide the 
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perception of “how far the policy has achieved the objectives” If the policy has been 
achieved, the assumption is that [Subroto, 2011] with a positive outcome, the public 
can benefit from the policy implementation which will lead to higher positive public 
satisfaction. This in turn, will indicate the success of the policy [Smith, 1997]. 
Generally, evaluation of policy is carried out by experts who are knowledgeable and 
understand the processes and objectives of the evaluation [Tosun, 2008]. Evaluators 
of policy must be motivated and be able to link policy and performance; this requires 
skill and more knowledge and promote consensus about policy choices [Hallsworth, 
2011]. As Barkenbus [1998] asserts, “policy evaluation is most often a forgotten 
element”; in addition, two questions must be answered when evaluating policy, “how 
has the policy worked?” and “How can implementation of policy be improved?” The 
feedback will identify new problems that have arisen during the implementation 
process [Tosun, 2008]. As such, the negative feedback from policy evaluation could 
prove embarrassing to policy makers and implementers. Furthermore, the failure in 
policy implementation can be translated to perceived need to repress uncomfortable 
facts derived from impartial evaluation, or the need to conduct evaluation in a context 
certain to show positive results [Barkenbus, 1998]. This tendency explains the 
reason why evaluation is often ignored by decision makers. This highlights an issue 
to be resolved and leads to learning what the shortfalls or success of policy has been 
[Tosun, 2000; Barkenbus, 1998]. Evaluation of policy enables decision makers to 
draw lessons from the operation of the policy [Tosun, 2008]. Hence it is crucial to 
follow exactly what the policy detects. 
Geoffrey [2011] argues that the growing size and complexity of government could 
become overwhelming to weak institutions and would impede successful policy 
results. In Canada, for instance, departmental programs are aligned with strategic 
objectives and outcomes of the policy. In the same vein, where co-ordination of 
programs and outcomes are linked, it is easy to see where the implementation of the 
policy went wrong.  
2.10.  CONCLUSION  
The section above has identified concepts of policy analysis, different models, 
specifically the process model. Further, stages of the policy process from setting the 
agenda to the last stage, policy evaluation have been explained. The method of 
creating policy affects the context of public policy. As such, the policy stages help the 
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empirical research in guiding and influencing the new themes that might develop 
from data collected. Moreover, the policy process analysis is based on the 
reconsideration of ARF and its aim is verified whether a particular process was 
followed in establishing Act 51 of 2000.  
The next part of this study is the methodology. The method in which data was 
collected and analysed is explained below. 
 27 
 
CHAPTER 3:  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
3.1.  INTRODUCTION  
This chapter presents the methodology used in the study. A qualitative method has 
been followed to analyse the DIRCO case study. The case study is about the African 
Renaissance Fund Policy Processes Act, 51 of 2000. The aim of the study was to 
explore the policy processes that led to the establishment of this Act (ARF) from 
2000 to 2009. 
The methods used to collect data included: semi structured interviews, observations 
and document analysis. The purpose of the chapter is to introduce a vivid description 
of tools, methods or techniques that have been used in this study. Neuman [2011:1] 
states that this “means understanding the entire research process including its 
social-organisational context, philosophical assumptions, ethical principles, and the 
political impact of the new knowledge from the research”. Research methodology 
can be simply defined as the study by which knowledge in a study is gained. As 
such, this section provides direction of the manner in which this research was 
conducted by describing the paradigm approach, research design, research sample, 
data collection and the research limitations. It also provides an insight into how the 
data was analysed, validated, and then provides a conclusion. 
The examination of the policy processes that were followed by the Government of 
South Africa in its reconsideration of its development aid policy for ARF has been 
done. The research took place in Pretoria at the Department of International 
Relations and Co-operation where a case of the ARF policy making processes was 
examined. The intention in analysing the policy processes was to foster 
understanding of: the underlying issues that led to the need of a policy rethink 
between 2000 and 2009, the policy processes that were followed, and the policy 
making model which was adopted. The research includes an analysis of both 
primary and secondary data as described in the following sub-sections. 
 
3.2.  RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY  
“The philosophical orientation or paradigm approach was qualitative as it seeks to 
foster understanding of the policy processes through interpretive explanations about 
how things or actions worked out as expressed and their meanings and subjective 
views” [Neuman, 2011:84]. Policy processes in South Africa have constructed 
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meanings with which they are associated and this research looked to gather 
information as part of this examination to contribute more to the broader knowledge. 
A qualitative approach was appropriate for this research as it provided independent 
findings which Merriam [1995:52] asserts “are innovative or newer looking at familiar 
problems or when determining the historical trajectory of a situation”. Because the 
research is qualitative, a thick description of interpreted meanings from the data 
collected is presented in the next chapter [Bryman, 2012].  
 
Research strategy means a general orientation to the conduct of social research 
[Bryman & Burgess, 2002]. This study was an interpretive examination of the policy 
processes that followed consideration by the government of South Africa of its 
development aid policy. As such, it utilised a descriptive phenomenological strategy 
which aimed at identifying the structure of processes as described by the research 
respondents [Bryman, 2012]. Lack of clarity and misconceptions existed about the 
policy model and processes being followed in the making of the ARF Act. Hence, the 
adoption of a descriptive phenomenology strategy offered a better view from the 
participants who experienced events and the changes taking place with the Act. 
 
3.4.  RESEARCH DESIGN  
Research design, according to Bryman [2012], means a framework for analysis and 
collection of data. This research is a case study of the African Renaissance Fund 
and co-operation. A case study entails a detailed and intensive analysis of a “single 
case” of a broad topic [Bryman 2012: 66]. The fact that the deliberations of the ARF 
Act are a component of the broader foreign policy of South Africa justified this 
research as a case study. Case studies tend to produce complex explanations or 
interpretations in the form of an unfolding plot or a narrative story about particular 
people or specific events [Neuman 2011: 42]. This makes the passage of time 
integral to the explanation as quite often the emphasis is on the sequence of events: 
what occurred first, second, third, and so on. The focus on processes helped to 
reveal how the ARF Act has evolved and developed over the years.  
Creswell [2003] and Neuman [2011] agree that there are a number of strengths in 
conducting research as a case study, one of them is that this works in favour of the 
researcher conducting this research as a case study, includes the ability to capture 
complexity and trace processes, it also clarifies thoughts by allowing the researcher 
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to link abstract ideas about the policy making processes in South Africa with the 
concrete specifics of the observed case. This research design was also appropriate 
because the responses of the participants and the documentation were shared, 
analysed and used to enhance our understanding of policy processes used by the 
South African government. 
3.5.  SAMPLING  
Neuman [2011] defines sampling as the process of selecting a set of respondents 
selected from a larger population for research purposes. The respondents for this 
research were purposefully selected because of their unique expertise in their 
respective fields and their knowledge of the ARF policy making processes. The 
researcher conducted this study using a semi-structured interviewing technique with 
open-ended and closed ended questions to the respondents about their views and 
their assessment of the policy processes. A purposeful sampling was used for the 
selection of 10 participants for this study as it allowed for the selection of research 
participants according to the needs of the study.  
Purposeful sampling allowed the researcher to use a wide range of methods to 
locate all possible cases of a highly specific and difficult to reach population 
[Neuman 2011].  The sample consisted of DIRCO Officials, ARF officials, Academia 
and Public Policy Analysts. The selection criterion for inclusion in this research was 
on the basis of their unique status, experience, and knowledge of policy processes in 
South Africa. 
3.6.  DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE  
A field scan of the environment was carried out by the researcher prior to engaging 
respondents and the relevant documents. This informed the researcher about the 
environment while also getting to know where and how to get the necessary 
documents. Mail was sent to the prospective participants, requesting their 
participation in the research. Telephonic requests for availability were made for the 
DIRCO and ARF Officials. Instructions from DIRCO have been followed to 
administer the study. Each participant was contacted and a suitable location and 
time of interview was arranged. 
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3.6.1  PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DATA  
A procedure consisting of a written semi-structured interview schedule was used to 
obtain data and, where permission had been granted, to record interview sessions. 
Having such a schedule allowed for questions to be asked the same way each time. 
The flexibility to probe was allowed, change of sequence and questions to 
accommodate respondents and issues that arose. The respondents were selected 
as follows: 
Fig. 2 
Author: Researcher 
 
  
Data collection for this research included both primary and secondary data. The 
primary data entailed interviews, diaries and speeches [Bryman, 2012]. The other 
means of collecting data was secondary data, which included, among other things, 
but not limited to, published annual reports, ANC conference report, political 
speeches, press release and political programs. The inclusion of secondary data 
gave the research a view of perceptions from secondary sources, while also giving a 
world view of policy processes.  
Dirco officials ARF officials Academia 
Legal advisors 
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3.7.  DATA ANALYSIS  
Neuman [2011] contends that data analysis in qualitative research is descriptive in 
nature and it assists in interpreting raw data into understandable findings. Bryman 
and Burgess [2002] and Neuman [2011] also agree that qualitative data analysis 
entails ordering and the examination of information to make sense and establish 
meaning. The researcher firstly read all participants’ transcribed data collected from 
the interviews and the relevant documents for familiarisation.  The next step was 
reviewing the purpose of the research so as to sift significant statements and 
phrases relevant to examination of policy processes in DIRCO from each transcript.  
Respondents’ responses were recorded and data from the policy documents has 
been interpreted to make sense. Descriptive data relevant to the research questions 
has been categorized to their unique meaning to form familiar qualitative 
characteristics. Coding was used to interpret data, this assisted in relating themes to 
theory, and this is referred as coding according to Bryman [2012]. Bryman and 
Burgess [2002] add that meaning should be categorised or organised into themes 
which evolve from theme clusters to theme categories. A rich and exhaustive 
description of the views and assessments of respondents based on the different 
stages of the policy making process has been provided. The diagram below provides 
stages of the policy making process in which data was collected and analysed.  
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Fig. 3 
Adopted from: Dunn [1994] 
 
3.8.  DATA VALIDATION AND R ELIABILITY  
Bryman [2012] asserts that research is valid when it is supported by a variety of 
sources. Data validation involves offering a fair, honest and balanced account of 
social reality. This means how reliable, dependable or consistent are the research 
findings congruent with reality [Merriam 1995]. This qualitative study’s validity was 
confirmation through the use of different approaches to check the validity and 
reliability of the findings.  
Triangulation from different data sources: both primary and secondary data was 
used to build comprehensible themes [Merriam, 1995; Neuman, 2011]. Different 
respondents were interviewed using the same interview schedule and emerging 
themes were compared across the board. 
Member checks was used to affirm the correctness of the findings through taking the 
final report or specific descriptions or themes back to participants to determine 
truthfulness [Merriam 1995]. Member checks also established credibility as 
transcripts were sent to respondents for review and verification. Each respondent 
agreed with the transcribed data of their individual interviews.  
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3.9.  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE S TUDY  
The research report was structured according to the policy decision making process 
with the focus on the ARF policy process. The result of this study intended to add 
more knowledge on public policy decision making processes. It hoped to help the 
ARF agency develop strategic direction on how they will close the gap in the 
weakness of the policy making process. 
3.10.  ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
Prior to the interviews, the researcher requested permission from the relevant 
authorities to conduct research. Participants were requested to read through and 
sign a consent form on the nature of their participation. The researcher explained to 
the respondents that their participation in the research was for academic purposes, 
voluntary and that their identification would be kept confidential. 
3.11.  CONCLUSION  
The ARF policy making process is the new development aid policy in the democratic 
SA. It receives aid from countries like Europe and US. The development aid supports 
developing countries in the SADC and UN. It is also meant to build and maintain 
good relations in these countries. Therefore, the ARF represents a development 
partner in Africa and, in turn, the good relations developed is South Africa’s 
comparative advantage. 
The purpose of this study was to explore the policy making process of ARF. The 
research responds to the problem experienced in the making of the ARF Act. The 
transition of the Act involved a challenging policy process in the foreign policy. This 
chapter has highlighted the method and methodology utilised to inform the research 
content and context. The next chapter presents data from the field researched. 
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CHAPTER  4:  DATA PRESENTATION  
 
4.1.  INTRODUCTION  
This chapter presents data as collected from the interviews. Data was collected 
using a primary method as indicated in the preceding chapter. Specified from 
chapter one in the problem statement, it indicated  that the ARF has suffered 
institutional incapacities, inconsistent actions to policy, misappropriation of funds, 
lack of proper co-ordination, unaccountability, to mention a few, which suggests the 
ineffectiveness of the development policy of the Republic. The study is meant to 
explore the policy process leading to the establishment of ARF Act from 2000 to 
2009. As such, this chapter intends to present the data collected. The data collected 
from DIRCO was categorised in themes in order to give a deep understanding of the 
policy process leading to the establishment of ARF. The data was collected by the 
researcher through recordings from semi-structured interviews. The themes that 
prevailed from interviews are the following: Accountability, Consultation and co-
ordination, Governance, Human resource management, Monitoring and evaluation, 
Participation in policy makers, Project management, Power influence and Enablers 
and Constraints within ARF. After intense interviews with policy makers, data was 
transcribed for analysis.  
This chapter offered responses from policy makers through interviews concerning 
the main question of the research which asked “What was the policy process that led 
to the establishment of ARF?” The manner in which this chapter flows is: It starts by 
providing guidance on research, followed by the profile of policy makers, case view, 
views of policy makers, ARF policy process, policy initiation, legality of policy, the 
white paper, reasons for the Act, political debates, analysis of the problem, 
stakeholder’s participation, consultation and co-ordination, ARF capacity, challenges 
encountered by ARF, implementation procedure, enablers and constraints in ARF, 
policy makers suggestions, annual reports and finally, concluding remarks.     
Policy makers were asked questions related to policy process of ARF in order to 
provide answers to why the policy was established. As such, questions were asked 
to uncover details on setting the agenda, policy formulation, policy adoption, 
implementation of policy and monitoring and evaluation stage. The themes prevailed 
from the response of policy makers gave an overview of how ARF came into 
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existence, how it was implemented and at the end what the challenges were. It was 
established that policy initiation, Political debates, Stakeholders’ participation, 
Consultation and co-ordination, Enablers and Constraints were some of the main 
themes that prevailed from the research about ARF policy establishment processes. 
 
4.2.  RESEARCH GUIDE  
The researcher asked the same questions to policy makers in the form of a semi-
structured interview guide. There was probing where the response was not clear in 
order to keep the interview focused on the aim of the research.  
4.3.  SAMPLE PROFILE  
The sample of eight respondents was all from Gauteng. Some of the respondents 
interviewed have left the department after working for more than ten years in the 
department. Four interviewees were still working from the department and have been 
since 1994. Some of the policy makers from top management could not make it to 
their interview due to the intense work schedules and working outside the country. 
The sample of policy makers interviewed consisted of eight interviewees. 
The following policy makers formed part of the interviews: 
 Former Director General 
 Former Advocate 
 Former Chartered Accountant 
 Director 
 Director and Secretary  
 3 X Public officials 
The organisation from which the data was collected is the Department of 
International Relations and Co-operation (DIRCO) and the focus was on ARF. Data 
and facts relating to questions of the research are categorized based on their 
characteristics. A summary of interviews is provided under the main themes using 
the exact quotes from the respondents. The analysis of the ARF policy process have 
considered the micro and macro policy processes, the stakeholders involved in 
making of the policy and the officials who implemented the Act. The capacity in 
which the analysis flows is from the view of achieving the objectives set by the Act. 
The flow of this data starts from the issues of South African foreign policy, the status 
and the policy process of ARF. Sandhlane [2007], cited in More [1995], argues that 
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the analysis of the policy process has to take into account the legitimacy, political 
viability with political leadership and direction to substantial valuation of the policy 
process. 
4.4.  CASE OVERVIEW  
ARF Act repealed the pre-existing Economic Co-operation Promotion Loan Fund 
Act, 1968 (Act No. 68 of 1968), as amended by the Economic Co-operation loan 
Fund Amendment Act, 1986 (Act No. 29 of 1986) and the Economic Co-operation 
Promotion Loan Fund Amendment Act, 1998 (Act No. 16 of 1998) [DIRCO, 
2004]. The current Act is the African Renaissance and International Co-operation 
Fund (Act No 51 of 2000). It was published on 22 January 2001. It provides for 
the establishment of the ARF for the purpose of enhancing integration and co-
operation with and on the African Continent and to validate the Republic of South 
Africa’s commitment to the continent [Hall, 2004]. The case study is about the 
policy process leading to the establishment of ARF.  The post-apartheid act 16 of 
1998 which was previously a loan act utilised by the then government of South 
Africa prior to 1994, reflected the origins of act 51 of 2000 before amendment. 
The loan fund act had no clear strategic plan on the way in which funds should be 
administered. Any African country could request financial assistance when in 
need; South Africa would disburse the required funds to that specific country with 
no follow up of how the funds had been used. From 1998, there was political 
discussion within government to replace this fund with new objectives. In 2000, 
act 51 of 2000 was approved replacing the loan fund. The Act was amended into 
act 51 of 2000 and implemented on the 22 January 2001. The ARF Fund has 
been referred to as the “technical assistance fund” which was meant to assist in 
economic, political and social challenges in the African continent.  
The government Gazette [2000] provided the objectives of the new fund as stated 
below:  
1. Co-operation between SA and other countries, particularly African 
countries 
2. The promotion of democracy and good governance 
3. Prevention and resolution of conflict 
4. Socio-economic development and integration 
5. Humanitarian assistance and 
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6. Human resource development. 
 
4.5.  POLICY PROCESS FOR ES TABLISHMENT OF ACT 51  OF 2000 
The policy process, according to Dunn [1994], revealed five different stages in which 
a policy can be established. The stages include: agenda setting, policy formulation, 
policy adoption, policy implementation and policy assessment. The policy process is 
simplified by De Coning [2004] into three stages: policy formulation, policy 
implementation and monitoring and evaluation. 
The initiation stage of policy, according to De Coning [1994; 1995], regards 
legitimacy and stakeholder’s consultation as important in the initiation of the 
establishment of an act.  
Respondents reported that stakeholders in the establishment of ARF included the 
political parties such as the ANC, the Democratic Party (DA), the Freedom Front 
(FF) and the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP). It is only civil society 
organisations that did not play a part in the policy process. The main people who 
drafted the Act were government officials: Respondent B modified the act and fixed 
all the legal wording, while Respondent A assisted with his experience of working 
directly with the African continent. He (Respondent A) knew what the challenges 
were in Africa. The policy makers were in agreement that no particular process was 
followed in forming the act. They highlighted the fact that the bill was required to 
include the principles, its intention, the guidelines indicated how it should function 
and to form a committee who would oversee the running of the fund. The president 
at the time wanted something simple and quickly done so that the fund could be 
established. No particular process was followed to form the ARF Act. The Act was 
motivated by former president Thabo Mbeki’s idea of African Renaissance.    
The national assembly gave the ruling for the mandate and legitimacy of the Act. The 
consultation for the process of making the Act took place within government and 
parliament. There was no formal consultation done outside government, locally and 
internationally. The basis of the Act originates from the Economic Loan fund which 
was amended to form ARF. Discussions about what needed to be amended and 
included took place at DIRCO in Pretoria. There were various meetings held by the 
department. Respondent A, B and C, were some of the stakeholders who 
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participated in the process of establishing the Act at the time. The contribution they 
made was used as the genesis in drafting act 51 of 2000. 
 
4.6.  LEGITIMACY OF POLICY  
 
4.6.1. How a Bill Act becomes law in South Africa 
 
Table1.  Author: Parliament [2014] 
The process of the Bill becoming into law in SA: 
The normal process starts from the national executive council of the ANC. Then it becomes a 
discussion document called a green paper. This process is initiated in the department that deals with 
the issue at hand. It is published so that people can comment and suggest ideas. It is then drafted 
and sent to NA. The National Assembly looks at a bill, and sends it to a parliamentary portfolio 
committee for consideration. The portfolio committee recommends changes and returns the bill to the 
National Assembly; it then becomes a legislative proposal, a white paper. At least seventy five 
percent of the members of the National Assembly must vote in favour of the bill for it to be approved 
by the National Assembly. The National Assembly approves the bill, and sends it to the National 
Council of Provinces (NCOP) who considers it. Then it is sent to NA to be passed. The vote of the 
majority of the national assembly decides on the finalities of the bill. It then becomes an act if it gets a 
two-thirds majority in the National Assembly and six provinces support from the NCOP. The National 
Assembly passes the bill. The bill is sent to the President. He signs it and it gets published in 
the Government Gazette. When this has happened, the bill becomes law and is called an Act 
of Parliament. 
 
4.6.2. REGULATIONS FOR PUBLIC SERVICE  
It must be noted that only in 2010 the government decided to introduce a Monitoring 
and Evaluation department. As such, this programme was absent when the ARF Act 
was implemented in 2001. The Department of Public Services and Administration 
(DPSA) regulates how public officials should deliver services when working for the 
government. The guidelines below were extracted from the regulations of the DPSA. 
 
4.6.3.  DPSA  APPROACH TO MONITORING AND EVALU ATION  
Monitoring and Evaluation is meant to focus on the engagement of various 
stakeholders around inputs /outputs into policy monitoring.  
According to DPSA [2014], the stakeholders in policy are expected to do the 
following: 
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 Evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency and appropriatiness of Public Service 
policy implementation. In addition, Chapter 10 of the Constitution stresses 
principles of monitoring and evaluation in terms of: 
 Transparency to the public fostered through provision of timely, accessible 
and accountable information. Further to the above, the regulations stated by 
DPSA also emphasise the objectives that public service should be guided by: 
 To provide the Public Service with prescripts to facilitate the rollout of the 
monitoring and evaluation of the Public Service regulations and other DPSA’s 
legislative and regulatory mandates.  
 To provide the system to document, provide feedback and disseminate results 
and lessons learned. 
 To provide the mechanisms to support the implementation of an effective 
monitoring and evaluation system and guidance in respect of the activities to 
be carried out in relation to the implementation of the DPSA M&E system for 
the public service; and 
 To provide clear roles and responsibilities of the different stakeholders in the 
context of monitoring and evaluation. 
Therefore, a step-by-step approach to the processes, procedures and methods for 
monitoring and evaluating of public services with strategy and policies is expected to 
play a fundamental role in policy implementation. As a result, it will be complemented 
by a series of tools, such as Monitoring and Evaluation guidelines applicable to 
DPSA, public servants, programme managers as well as government.  
 
4.6.4.  CHAPTER 9  OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION : 
SS195: Basic Values and principles governing public administration states that: 
 s(e) Public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making; 
 s(f) Public administration must be accountable and 
 s(h) Good human-resource management and career-development practices 
must maximise human potential  and must be cultivated [Barnes,  de Klerk & 
Eldred, 2002]. 
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4.6.5.  THE 53RD ANC  CONFERENCE  
One of the items discussed in the National Executive Conference of the ANC was 
the ARF policy renewal. The draft resolution captured the recommendations made 
for the future of ARF. There was an extensive debate that ARF should be replaced 
by SADPA. Moreover, the 53rd National conference resolution of the ANC revealed 
important issues that must be taken into consideration when the decision making 
process is taking place. The following were the highlights for DIRCO on the 53rd ANC 
conference: 
Table 2.  Source: Congress [2012]  
Pillar 5:Policy development 
 
Foreign policy review: 
 The appraisal of ANC relationship 
with SA’s national interest 
 The state of bilateral relations and 
strengthening of Africa and 
Southern Africa 
The review of  international relations and 
solidarity work since 1994 through 
foreign policy of the ANC led government 
SADPA 
 The ANC encourages government 
to accelerate the establishment of 
SADPA to assist government in its 
vision of better Africa through 
solidarity and mutual assistance 
as well as of partnership with 
other development actors. 
 
The conference also highlighted that: 
 
“There shall be peace and friendship”. 
Therefore some of the work that is done 
by ARF is towards peace on the 
continent and in the world, whilst 
pursuing South Africa’s “interest”. The 
conference also mentioned that the ruling 
party strengthen the IBSA forum and its 
ability to respond to strategic 
developmental challenges facing 
developing countries. 
 
Capacity building for DIRCO: 
 
Assist government departments to 
strengthen infrastructure development 
capacity and capabilities to monitor 
economic maritime zones referred to as 
sea borders. 
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4.7.  THE  WHITE PAPER:  ACT 51  OF 2000 
Policy Process 
Before the ARF bill was put before parliament, a number of objectives for the bill 
were discussed and brought together by the government and developed into a white 
paper. The process of developing a white paper was initiated by the then president, 
Thabo Mbeki. Respondent A mentioned that “there was an urgent need” to have a 
fund that would allow South Africa to assist developing countries with the economy, 
political strength and social ills, the policy makers were instructed to treat the drafting 
of the Bill as urgent to accelerate the process. Respondent A and B made sure that 
the process of the bill did not take long. They drafted a simple and easy bill with the 
direct objectives and who was responsible for what, Respondent B mentioned that “I 
drafted the simple bill, the president wanted something that can assist with AR and it 
had to be done quickly, ‘cause the longer the bill, the longer it will take to get it 
approved to parliament”. The bill was sent to parliament for discussion. After it came 
back with modifications; Respondent A mentioned that, his colleague, (Respondent 
B) “presented the modified act to the interim committee, the modifications were fixed 
and the draft was sent back to parliament for approval. The bill was approved; it 
became an act on the 22 January 2001”. On other hand, an official raised an issue 
that the previous fund the “Economic Cooperation Loan Fund was used by the 
apartheid government to fund friends, for instance, the building of the presidential 
palace and assisted in building a hotel in Madagascar”. Therefore, the ANC 
government wanted to establish a fund that will not assist in favour of “personal 
friends” but used for development in African countries.  
 
4.8. VIEWS OF THE POLICY MAKERS   
This section presents the views of the policy makers of DIRCO. Respondents were 
asked to give an overview of how Act 51 of 2000 performed. They highlighted that 
the previous Act that repealed Act 51 of 2000 did not represent the “character” of 
Africa; the new ARF act was established to build the African character. The African 
character was described as a true representation of Africa. It was observable from 
the interviews that the former president, Thabo Mbeki, was the driving force behind 
the ARF establishment, “Thabo Mbeki called this technical assistance fund, the 
“African Renaissance and International relations cooperation fund”. The act itself 
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represented the building blocks of what the fund stood for. The latter was described 
as including economic, political and social development; the pillars were formed to 
address the African agenda. Policy makers emphasised the issues of conflict 
resolution, promoting peace, supporting human rights, community building, human 
resource development, creating bilateral relations with countries and good 
governance for development. The intent of the act was seen to provide financial 
support to assist neighbouring counties with development. ARF has been seen as 
assisting in resolving challenges when African countries were having general 
elections; this issue was described as political assistance. The latter development for 
the African continent meant building capacity in favour of building democratic 
principles. The policy makers expressed the need for funds in Africa to create jobs, 
products for the market for sustainable economic growth. It was a general view that 
the countries assisted with funding by the ARF would gradually grow their own 
economies. In terms of the social development, policy makers have generally agreed 
that making people understand their human rights, understand their communities 
would create a better life for people, women’s organisations, social organisations 
and help uplift people, in addition to economic development.  
 
4.9.  THE PROBLEM IDENTIFIED/AGENDA SETTING  
The question was asked of policy makers what the reason was behind the 
establishment of Act 51 of 2000. The same question was asked across all the 
policymakers who were interviewed. Scholars argue that before the decision may be 
taken to form a policy, there must be an agenda or an identified problem by the 
government to initiate the process of making policy [Eustis, 2000]. In government, 
there is a norm that when society is dissatisfied with the services rendered by the 
government, they will protest, when this happens on a regular basis to an extent that 
it affects the economy, it could lead to government wanting to develop a policy that 
delivers services satisfactorily to stop the unhappiness in the society.  
There was a general consensus from the policymakers on the objectives around the 
establishment of Act 51 of 2000. The respondents agreed that, amongst other things, 
development played a huge role in establishing the act. Respondent E stated that 
“it’s all those five objectives of the act: the community building, humanitarian 
assistance, economic development bilateral co-operation’s, capacity building, human 
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resource development or economic deployment”. While Respondent B also alluded 
that “a number of countries looked for assistance in one area or another and within 
government there was no institution that was capable of providing this type of 
assistance for funds”. There was a situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) where the country needed assistance for their general elections.  For 
instance; Respondent D stated “The DRC wanted to have elections but does not 
have money for the printing of ballots or participation of ballots that caused a huge 
havoc”. This is one of the areas that the Act was made for, as Respondent C 
referred to it as political assistance for the African agenda. However, one official 
argued that the previous loan fund that was supposed to assist strictly in 
development was sometimes misused by the then government for their personal 
friends. For instance “This fund was used to help political friends, for example, the 
building of the Presidential palace in Lilongwe and assistance in building a hotel in 
Madagascar, it was decided that a controlled fund needs to be established” 
commented Respondent A. Among the common reason from the policy makers, 
Respondent H added that “......let us go back and re-embraced by the world, we 
ourselves were open to business, let the world come to SA, embrace the issues of 
conflicts resolutions, we promote peace to embrace the new democracy” 
In summary, although the policy makers did not mention all the objectives of 
establishing the act, they all agreed and referred to the five objectives stated in the 
act. The researcher observed that the policy makers that were interviewed displayed 
a common understanding of why the act was established. 
 
4.10. POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS  AROUND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ARF 
Political debates and consensus around the establishment of the act can render the 
policy void or valid. Various authors argue that consultation in policy decision making 
may allow various opinions to be debated while at the end it could promote 
consensus about policy choices [Freeman, 2013; Bridgman, 2003; Weible, et al, 
2012]. Policy makers at DIRCO are of the opinion that the process of the act had no 
major parties opposing it during the discussions in parliament. Respondent D 
maintains that “the initiative of the act would have been only ANC but the final editing 
would have involved all political parties because this was done through legislation 
and the process would be that they would submit it to parliament and all political 
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parties would be involved; to the best of my knowledge all political parties 
participated in parliament”. Respondent C added that “ARF was understood. I mean 
the DA didn’t even, conceptually it did not have the problem with the fact ARF was 
the pillars for SA foreign policy set the central African agenda because it meant so 
much, even if you are representing the constituency, it was good for everybody”. 
Respondent F alluded “it was good for everybody, there was no opposition parties 
opposing it”. Views varied in support of the creation of this act as Respondent A 
argues that “the interim committee included parties like ANC, DA and UDM, these 
parties supported the Bill, ACDP and FF did not support the establishment, they 
were concerned that the ANC might use the fund for their personal interest. During 
this time Civil society representatives were there, but did not play part in the founding 
of the bill. Only government officials founded the Bill”. On the contrary, Respondent 
D’s opinion was that “there was no debate about the form of action of the act, it was 
entirely government who decided, the decision was not debated in parliament and 
there was not really a debate from other parties. The ruling party took a decision 
from the conference, that indeed they need ARF and they asked the government to 
consider the matter, the government, only government, decided to amend the 
previous act”.  
In summary, about 90% of policy makers somehow agree that debates about the 
formation of the act appeared to run smoothly, while about 10% of policy makers 
claim that the ruling party and government decide on its own with no inclusion of 
other parties’s opinions. 
 
4.11. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM  
In relation to the analysis of the process, literature stresses the importance of a 
system’s capacity and its good governance to be put as priority in the success of the 
policy process [Dunn, 1994; Smith, 1997]. The respondents were asked what 
method they have followed in analysing the policy.  Almost all policy makers 
interviewed did not remember any model used in the analysis of forming the policy. 
Respondent B “So, the long discussions and a whole lot of people, in fact, by the 
time the legislation was drafted, it was two people, between me and respondent A, 
so I was from the leadership SA, by then respondent A was involved in Africa 
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division, so he was familiar with the concepts, so we drafted and we took it up and 
then it was approved”.  
4.12. PARTICIPATION IN POLICY DECISION  
Respondents were asked who the stakeholders were who were involved in the 
development of the idea of ARF. They all spoke the same language. For instance, 
Respondent B said “Treasury and DIRCO”. While Respondent D mentioned that “It 
was us (DIRCO) and Treasury”. Respondent B added that “I think from government 
side there were different departments involved. It was DIRCO, presidency, the 
parliamentary committee and both the department of finance and, I think those were 
the key stakeholders. In general there is consensus that government was the key 
stakeholder in decision making”. 
 
4.13.  CONSULTATION AND CO-ORDINATION  
Policy makers were asked if consultation was done in the establishment of the act, 
Officials from DIRCO believe that the process of consultation while making the act 
was absent. As such, Respondent C commented “No, not really, ARF was operating 
slightly different, I can’t even think of the model similar to that, it was a more of 
targeted to SA, because we wanted to be more aggressive in advancing the African 
agenda so actually people found that it would be easy to amend that Act, they looked 
at that act and see that something’s were relevant, crafted the new act and then it 
became the ARF”. Those were the views of officials about the art of forming the act. 
 
4.14.  ARF  CAPACITY  
Dunn [1994] and Smith [1997] stress the importance of a system’s capacity and its 
good governance to be put as priority in the success of the policy. When policy 
makers were asked if ARF had full capacity to run its funds, the bulk of policy makers 
were agreed that the capacity of the act needed some boosting.  
 Financial Resources 
Respondent E added “a big pause,  No , we do we have the funds”. While 
Respondent C lamented that “Ja (yes) no, for the act ARF, the way it was structured, 
it had the capacity to reach the goals of the Act. So you would say actually about 
99.9% of the money used from the ARF was actually for the goals of the act 
while......  ARF did not have huge amounts of money, so we would offer money for 
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the small part”. Respondent D added “The ARF never had problem with the budget, 
normally we will fund the project for the initial payment and it was done on time and 
the payment afterwards was normally a problem, provided that there was a problem 
with the equipment in the project, so, but I will imagine, but I know that we never 
funded all of them, we always funded a part of it and the expected other funding 
were excluded”. 
 Human Resources 
“No, not from ARF, the experts were from DIRCO. DIRCO will identify the experts, if 
the projects required for instance civil services, the experts are not from DIRCO, and 
they are from DPSA. The biggest problem we’ve encountered is discontinuity in 
leadership, because people will refuse to go back where they were posted during the 
running of these projects so people did not have defined roles, this was the 
issue.....a lack of continuity both in terms of the people” commented Respondent C.  
Respondent E added “I don’t think we have the personnel, we don’t have the Human 
resources, I think the financial risk is the human resources and all of that,  Yes, yes 
we’re short staff, there are not even full time people in ARF you must remember, 
because ehh I mean ARF is a public entity that is based at DIRCO and does not 
have personnel so we get everything, the entity uses people from DIRCO 
sometimes, we are employees of DIRCO not like other public entities, the issues are 
the personnel” Respondent A added “ARF was run by four people. They were 
working with number of things”. While Respondent D said “There’s never enough 
people, you had the skills to do the administration in terms of capacity to do that....”. 
Respondent B “No, it was ok, they did ok, no body complained there, they need to 
advance human rights, they need to advance their democracy and so on and those 
skills resided within the departments  and those were there”. Respondent F “were 
they skilled? No, no, well, not specific, there were general skill there, they were just 
sent there for three months, they were not sent there to monitor the projects”. 
Respondent H added “Yhu (Oh no) ! Jack of all trades master of none. I doubt if they 
know”. 
 
 Infrastructure 
Respondent D “No, It was never the intention of the ARF to run the projects, the 
intention of ARF was to provide funding. Our project management task was to see 
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that these projects are run according to plan”. Respondent E “but the actual project 
management part of it, the capacity was really lacking”. 
There was a general view that some improvement on the capacity of ARF will make 
the projects run quicker than it does. 
4.15.  CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED BY ARF 
Respondent C “My view is that not so much challenges during the establishment, it 
was so much of challenges during the operation, and it all had to do with the 
accountability”. Moreover, Respondent D lamented “Yes! many, many challenges, 
first of all the accountability challenges” Respondent A “At the Polokwane 
conference, it was discussed that ARF had challenges; it did not have a project 
management”. Respondent E “The Act was enacted years ago I don’t think they look 
10 to 30 years, over the years the need for assistance has grown in fixed proportions 
I mean giving funds of R100M and all of that, is a lot of money so you need to 
account for it how, so the policy didn’t look far ahead, also the administrative and 
issues involved are not quoted for quite in the act, you got to follow the money and 
account so that kind of thing. So those are one of the things that needs time but 
we’re good, its fine”. 
 Project Management 
“I mean so, no you’ve got so much, people don’t have the same energy in the 
countries that you’re helping that was becoming  difficult to manage” lamented 
Respondent C. In addition “at the Polokwane conference, it was discussed that ARF 
had challenges; it did not have a project management. The decision was taken to 
establish SADPA” Respondent A lamented.  In fact the question asked is how we 
know that indeed those projects are taking place. Now, you needed an arm, the ARF 
was not able to do that, but we needed an arm maybe an inspecting arm or a 
professional arm to actually go and look at all the projects that have been assisted 
by SA development assistance and actually see through that it ran from start to 
conclusion that was feasible for ARF to do. The second thing is that, we will never 
know for instance provided two hundred million rand how it was managed, in fact the 
question asked is how we know that indeed those projects are taking place, 
lamented Respondent D. Respondent B added “I think whoever implemented the 
project. There would be an independent project implementer and eh so the embassy 
now and there will go and check because they needed to give a report about that so 
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they don’t run necessarily the running of the project, it will depend on the nature of 
the project, so yes, there were areas where we did the area where the area needed 
a commander”. 
 Monitoring and Evaluation 
 “The challenges was that which is not,  but the bill was nice and simple only after 
the bill has been implemented, the question was how then do you do monitor and 
evaluate, does the committee do monitoring and evaluation? No, who’s doing the 
monitoring and evaluation? What happened in the event that the money has been 
disbursed and has not been used, what’s the recourse was”, commented 
Respondent B. 
4.16.  POLICY OPERATION  
Officials were asked their view about the implementation of the policy. Respondent A 
“ARF gave us an instrument to measure”. “The bill was amended into act 51 of 2000 
and implemented on the 22 January 2001. On the 22 January 2001 the 
implementation of the bill started. The interim committee needed a strategic plan for 
the implementation as this was not part in the establishment process. Immediately 
after the adoption of the fund, tragedy started” said Respondent F. Respondent A 
added “The team who formed the committee, there was a rotation of teams to posts, 
the first team was the interim committee, this team knew what to do amid of the 
absence of project management”. Respondent G added “There was new team to 
rotate with the first team. However, this team did not know what to do. The challenge 
with operations of the fund was that we lost the ability to be creative and support”. In 
support, Respondent A said “African Renaissance Fund started with millions, this 
thing became big”.  
 Institutions involved in operation 
Respondent D “Ok, so, the project can come directly to the department (DIRCO) or 
to the ARF directorate, or it can come to one of the other departments, when it 
comes to one of the other departments. When the project comes directly to ARF, for 
instance International relations, our ARF is responsible, we did not have a project 
manager, who will run with that project to ensure that it was implemented that it’s run 
according to its plan...” Respondent E added “It should be DIRCO, and then it should 
be the recipient country or NGO that is given the grant and we as funder also 
oversee that the so then our embassies also act as an oversight in the country that 
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ask for a grant for assistance ja (yes), or...., sometimes it’s also the institution from 
SA that is asking for funding that is going to be implemented maybe in Lesotho or 
maybe Namibia.. Well, the implementing agent would be, in this case uhm... with 
DPSA and they will report them to the fund, depends to what they agreed between 
the fund in and quarterly or six months, so ja”.  
 Influence of power 
A question was asked from the policy makers, if power influenced the 
implementation of ARF. Respondent G “No not as far as you mean political 
influence? yes, it has happened last year, Namibia has this drought and the 
president had to help about Hundred million in terms of drought and the 
humanitarian assistance and ARF came and  kicked in”. Respondent F “Well, the 
ruling party was here and there, well, during those days, within government there 
was between ruling parties”. Respondent H “Did the political power influence the 
implementation of these projects? Everything that was dealt with outside the country 
has an element of foreign policy, foreign policy resides with political principles for 
example Malawi was having huge difficulties with regards to its economy, the 
president then took a decision that he will assist in funding the government with 
hundred million to provide the necessary support for the government so that was a 
political decision, in 2002 when the African cup of nation was supposed to take place 
in Mali and when our president Thabo Mbeki at that time Mali was not in a position to 
host the cup of nations and he (Mbeki) took a decision on that, this is an “African 
nation’s cup, we cannot allow it not to take place” (Thabo Mbeki), so then the 
president decided that SA will support the world cup with the value of twenty million 
to support that project, so you’ll find out that the political influence is largely on the 
foreign relations”. Respondent F “Well, uhm, I cannot say; now I have to be careful. 
The process where, one will argue that the influenced by the presidency but again 
there it was logically and it was far much more the process, now we had to, for 
example when we were dealing with elections in the Congo, president Mbeki was the 
main facilitator of this, at some point there was an issue of whether the ballots were 
going to be printed, people were delaying the process and SA took a decision that 
because it was very important for the Congo to continue to go to the elections 
otherwise it would have gone to war, that was underway. The other big one, again, 
was that President Jacob Zuma was the main facilitator in Burundi during president 
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Mbeki’s time, he had to close the deal, the UN was moving slowly about putting a 
peace keeping force and SA decided to assist. Those were very important”. 
 Processes 
Respondent E “Yes, it’s not easy, information is not easy, sometimes it’s not easy for 
instance let’s say uhm  Guinea Conakry, when you implement the project there 
become too many actors sometimes the implementing agent is from the certain 
country and therefore the recipient country has to take responsibility because it is the 
implementing agent and we as a funder, has our own expectations and so those 
actors there so we have a lease agreement so  because we are the funders we need 
to follow the money up until it reaches the intended purpose or the intended recipient 
in that particular country, I mean it is not that easy, sometimes you have to look and 
the contact and you see debtor and you don’t understand why you must consult 
through them, all those kind of things and because the money needs to be even if 
the recipient country uses the implementation agent in their own country but we need 
to follow them, where are they buying the goods, they have to buy their goods in SA 
first or in the region or the region they may buy from Europe whatever the you know, 
ja (yes), or you found those things, we had to deliver aid to Kenya about two years 
ago. If they use our money, they have to buy within the continent it’s not negotiable”.  
 Reporting channels 
“Yes, reporting is a challenge sometimes, we don’t get to report on time and, 
sometimes monies released in countries for instance money for their public service 
project so what happen is” said Respondent E. Respondent B “Eh what treasury 
wanted was simply that they wanted that the ministry to run funds, to simply release 
money willingly they wanted to be able to  have a stake on, and so they insisted on 
the provision that for any disbursement  there must be concurrency from their 
ministry that’s all they wanted and then it made sense though that their members to 
be in the board so that they can approve, and they can see the process from its 
inception and approve it. First, in that way you don’t have the foreign ministry 
cooking on itself and approving projects, himself, in that way you don’t have the 
foreign ministry and then when it goes to concurrency, they say no, because they 
were parties in its approval they are able to explain to their minister that yes we were 
in the board and yes we did approve so that is the way they did things”. Respondent 
B added “What I know about the reporting lines, even the setting up of this, the 
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secretary (Respondent E) it was an afterthought, afterthought because basically how 
it  suppose to be is a, there is an intent the manner in which how the money is going 
to be disbursed. So how would this be done, should it be done through the board 
and then, what happens after the board, then the board then take it to the minister, 
then it goes to the minister of finance, when they agree, the money is disbursed and 
that’s it, who reports to whom afterwards......”. Respondent D added “There were 
major challenges in reporting. Reporting did not take place as it should be until the 
system of reporting was introduced two to three years ago. They will take for 
instance instead of two to three years it will take five years. Secondly, the approach 
of the fund was to release funding as long as funds are given to the authorities with 
accountability requirements and then we found that you need a possibility of luck for 
that to happen; only when there were challenges, then you needed to report to ARF. 
So it was quite a bit of challenge when you need the process to run according to 
requirements”. Ultimately, Respondent C said “If it was about the civil service we will 
send the money to DPSA which was done by the DPSA, then we had a project in 
Guinea-Bissau or in guinea Conakry where they needed agriculture events so it was 
like that so each project they would be a government department that would come”. 
4.17.  ENABLERS AND CONSTRAINS OF RUNNING THE FUNDS .  
The African Renaissance fund’s objective of supporting the other countries in the 
continent continues to assist. However, South Africa itself has its own challenges in 
developing its own country. By assisting the continent with funds using its tool ARF it 
has experience constraints and enablers in putting the policy into action. Some of the 
questions raised to policy makers included asking them what enablers and 
constraints have they experienced during the operation of this fund. As such, 
respondent E said “It has the good intentions but it’s the issue of accountability you 
see. You need to have all possibilities, talent, regulations of public sector”. 
Respondent F added “Well, I would think eh, the main challenge is that it has to 
support for the intent and then the temptation to be used as a state fund, and an 
institutional framework is not simple because like so and so, it’s not going to be 
allowed because you get along with Thabo Mbeki, so that was the main challenge. 
People that releases the funds are officials so to have a backbone to say to the 
minister no we don’t understand, so was a number one challenge I would say. The 
other challenge was that most of the time setting up the monitoring and evaluation, 
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setting up the record keeping so that you have a  record precedent of knowledge so 
that you can apply to others, so those were the challenges”  
Respondent H added “It was a very simple legislation. The challenges was that 
which is not but the bill was nice and simple only after the bill has been implemented, 
the question was how then do you do monitoring and evaluation? Does the 
committee do monitoring and evaluation? No, who’s doing the M&E? What 
happened in the event that the money has been disbursed and has not been used? 
What’s the recourse? ”. Respondent F agreed “The uhm problem was the political 
decisions are difficult sometimes, of course for a good purpose did not follow the 
process. Now, if the president says, I’m going to fund for instance the fire that took 
place in..... you can’t wait overnight, it needs funding now, of course that decision 
does not follow the administration process of the fund, now, if the president phoned 
the minister and the minister asking for the funds, there is not recorded evident, it 
becomes a huge difficulty to write a request to the minister, so we can take copies of 
that and keep as an evidence. The administrative process become difficult when 
there is an emergency. The second constraint was the process that we had to follow, 
and I can tell you, besides the case of Lesotho where they say, the real emergency 
of the need for food, the ARF had to approve a fairly amount of money that they 
need, but because of the process that we had to follow when the food needs to be 
provided the next day but because of the process we need to follow, a monthly later, 
food is still not provided. So more often than not we found the project overwhelmed 
by the time. Very seldom will the problem be completed within the time frame.  So 
those were the constraints”. Respondent F “On the 22 January 2001 the 
implementation of the bill started, we needed a strategic plan for the implementation, 
this was not part of the act. Immediately after the adoption of the fund, “tragedy” 
started. There was a rotation of team to posts. The first team was the interim 
committee; this team knew what to do amid of the absence of project management. 
There was new team to rotate with the first team. However, this team did not know 
what to do”. Respondent A lamented “The challenge with operations of the fund was 
that we lost the ability to be creative and support”. Respondent C alleged “....... it was 
so much of challenges during the operation, and it all had to do with eh 
accountability, I mean it’s difficult sometimes you fund a project in another country 
and now you need accountability of how the funds, I mean so, no you’ve got so 
much, people don’t have the same energy in the countries that you’re helping that 
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was becoming difficult to manage”. “The monitoring and evaluation was the part that 
was difficult. The biggest problem we’ve encountered is discontinuity in leadership, 
because people will refuse to go back where they were posted during the running of 
these projects so people did not have defined roles, this was the issue, those were 
the challenges, a lack of continuity both in terms of the. People will feel frustrated, 
poor souls are running all sorts of adrenaline, this is not the only emergency that 
they are dealing with the other work they do and we expect them to focus on this 
thing, so it was difficult to appreciate people when they were there”. In contrast, 
Respondent B believed “In most of the countries we have embassies, so most of the 
time the embassies will do the monitoring. For example there was a long running of a 
project in Guinea Conakry, so the embassy monitored that, there was a project in 
Rwanda, where we had some medical doctors from ehh Cuba to assist them, when 
there was a genocide there, so the embassy was monitoring the projects, so they will 
provide a monitoring report, so usually we will use our embassies for monitoring”. 
It is the view of the policy makers that ARF’s intention was good and it was a simple 
and straightforward policy, however, because it had no forward looking plan and it 
lacked a strategy, there were a lot of challenges. They also stress that in the 
presence of project management the challenges it encountered would have been 
avoided. Unfortunately the act did not provide for strategic direction. Respondent B “ 
we had to look at the next project, without even needing to see the report” 
Respondent E “Yes, yes, so there are members and there is also alternative 
members” Respondent H “There are two parts of answers to answer this question: 
One is that we should have, you see the difficulty you have in this, is that any 
administrative or professional processes has impacted on the funding for the actual 
development itself”. 
4.18.  SUGGESTIONS FROM POLICY MAKERS  
ARF Act did not provide an open platform for policy makers to bring suggestions to 
counter problems that were missed at the establishment of the act. Nevertheless, 
policy makers had ideas how to mitigate the problems; however, there was no unit to 
look at these.  
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These were the views of policy makers: 
Respondent B alluded “the board that is going to evaluate the projects or the project manager; A 
proper guide to guide the independent board; The process by which the monitoring and evaluation 
report it must  be able to sit and look at the monitoring and evaluation ; there must be a record kept 
for all these projects it must be in e booklet form and be processed in a website so that people may 
know what kind of projects that SA so I think those are the kind of changes that need to be made”. 
Respondent E “I ... going forward with SADPA because there is a constraints within the ARF system, 
now we are working a fully fledged developing agency and hopefully SADPA will close all of those 
gaps, and the people would be working with SADPA will work hopefully closely most of the time. So 
SADPA is meant to be the answer. She added Yes, I mean if you’re a civil servant you have to follow 
what PFMA says. We prevent them by silence  appointing service providers in SA”.  
Respondent D “what we need to recruit in your projects professionals who are very, very skilled, 
project management, project implementation in particular areas of the project, but that should be part 
of the protocol. ARF should actually allocate one of its people work with these organisations and to 
give that person authority to make decisions where things are not happening as they should, because 
more often than not you’ll find the time the project comes to implementation, it took so long for 
implementation, most of time was used in planning you must be given authority so that you can take 
decisions, regularly auditing during the course of the project must take place, there should be 
inspectors tell to say you are suppose to finish this project at this time. Even the project manager, 
you’re given a project plan, tell us what have you done, and if not why. You have this high level 
project manager to make sure that indeed the project has taken place. We must come up with the 
proper mechanism, more importantly, the implementation of the project”. 
Respondent C “I mean I think the idea of SADPA came out, like we would like to do things like abo 
(the) China, to have like DPSA”. 
 
 
4.19.  ANNUAL REPORTS  
In addition to what the policy makers have said, information was extracted from the 
annual reports and the Auditor General Report regarding the performance of ARF for 
the past five years. The table below reflects the issues raised by the AG on ARF 
annual reporting.  
The Auditor General has drawn attention in the matters of governance arising on an 
annual basis from 2005 to 2009. Below are the issues raised by Auditor General:  
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These matters below could lead to the Auditor General quailifying the Audit report: 
2005: The ICT was not performing up to standard and AG instruction to the department was that, it 
had to be re-engineered and build a management capacity that is adequate for strategic financial 
management. Improvement on monthly and quarterly management and performance reports were 
raised. Motivate and encourage the culture of risk management and compliance to policies and 
procedures. Review and enhancement of the Human Resources Function. 
2006: The fund did not have an effective monitoring, evaluation and reporting on its performance in 
information consequently, the fund did not submit its performance information for auditing within the 
stipulated timeframe, as required by the National Treasury Guide for the Preparation of Annual 
Reports. AG has instructed the ARF to create an M&E system and submit a report at the end of each 
Financial year as required by National Treasury. 
2007: R29.9 million exceeded the initial amount pledged and contrary to section 5 of the African 
Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund Act 2000 (Act No 51 of 2000), these payments had 
not been regularised by the advisory committee and confirmation by the Minister of Finance was not 
obtained. AG requested regulated payments by the advisory committee and confirmation by the 
Finance Minister to be recorded 
2008: The financial statements submitted for audit were not subject to any material amendments 
resulting from the audit. In this financial year the AG was pleased with the good financial year 
reporting and reported no irregularities. 
2009: A risk assessment was conducted on a regular basis and a risk management strategy, which 
includes a fraud prevention plan, was documented and used as set out in Treasury Regulation 27.2. 
At this financial year end, AG reported no inconsistencies on ARF’s performance. 
 
 
 
The matters above were concerns prevailed from the annual reports of ARF 
highlighted by AG from 2005 to 2009. There were inconsistencies as reported by 
AG. However, the last  two years, 2008 and 2009. ARF showed an improvement in 
its reporting pertaining to financial reporting and governance issues. The AG 
reported for the last two years. 
 
4.19.  CONCLUSION  
This chapter has focused on the presentation of data that was provided by policy 
makers from the Department of International Relations and Co-operation. Their 
responses based on the questions they were asked relating to “What the policy 
process was that led to the establishment of ARF, in relation to exploring the policy 
process leading to the establishment of the ARF Act from 2000 to 2009. The 
responses relating to those questions raised their concerns relating to accountability,   
consultation and co-ordination, governance, human resource management, 
monitoring and evaluation, project management, participation in policy makers, 
power influence and enablers and constraints based on their experience working for 
DIRCO.  In summary, the process which started from the initiation of the Act to the 
implementation stage, according to policy makers has its own good intentions and in 
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the process of implementing it, has suffered challenges relating to its administration, 
incapacitated human resources, a lack of monitoring and evaluation process, 
accountability and project management. In the next chapter, an intense analysis of 
the findings is given, relating to the literature in chapter two. After intense interviews 
with policy makers, data were transcribed for analysis in Chapter five. 
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CHAPTER 5:  ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS  
 
5.1.  INTRODUCTION  
Chapter four presented data received from DIRCO policy makers. Policy makers 
included three ARF committee members, a legal advisor, a chartered accountant 
and three officials within DIRCO. It also offered themes derived from the experiences 
of policy makers in implementing Act 51 of 2000. The purpose of this chapter is to 
provide an analysis of data presented from the preceding chapter. The analysis 
provides a discussion of the themes thereby interpreting findings of the processes of 
establishing ARF. The findings from the analysis are directly linked to the theoretical 
reconsideration of chapter two. Chapter one described the purpose of this paper, 
which explored the policy process when Act 51 of 2000 was established. 
Furthermore, the research findings and conclusion are given. A quantity of themes 
explored follow in sequence such as: Accountability, consultation and coordination, 
Governance, Human resource management, Monitoring and evaluation, Participation 
in policy makers, power influence, Project management and enablers and 
constraints. The transcribed data provided the themes above and they were coded 
according to their grouping. 
 
5.0.1.  FINDINGS  
 
5.1.  SETTING THE AGENDA  
 
The birth of ARF 
In summary, the post 1994 democratic government triggered a concern for Africa’s 
development. It is in this regard that the former president, Thabo Mbeki, stood 
behind the creation of the African Renaissance. South Africa is seen as “hope” by 
the Western countries; President Mbeki articulated a strong commitment to assist in 
the revival and renewal of the African continent through the “African Renaissance” 
concept [Van Nieuwkerk, 2006]. Almost all Policymakers remembered the former 
president as a passionate force behind the creation of ARF. As a result, their views 
were that “the Act was motivated by former president Thabo Mbeki’s idea of African 
Renaissance”.    
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However, the former Economic Loan Fund at the time which was utilised by the 
apartheid government was used to favour their friends and needed to be replaced 
with a Fund that would focus on the development of an African agenda [Respondent 
C].  Because of all the economic, political and social challenges in Africa, the ARF 
came into existence. The intention of the fund was good, as described by 
Respondent E. However, the process by which the Act came into existence, was not 
a thorough process for policy decision making which could render the act ineffective 
when the act was put into practice, this process involves individuals, institutions and 
agencies to make it an effective process [Shepherd, 2011]. 
 
Policy process for ARF 
The policy process, according to Dunn [1994], revealed five different stages in which 
a policy can be established. The stages included: agenda setting, policy formulation, 
policy adoption, policy implementation and policy assessment. Within each stage of 
the process, an intense engagement should be followed to ensure that there is no list 
of weaknesses when the act becomes a law. However, in the case of ARF, 
government needed a “quick” bill to be drafted in order to accelerate the process. 
Looking at what the literature says about establishing an Act, it appears that the 
constitution and the ANC conference support a thorough process in forming an act. 
The advantage about the bill is that it was simple and easy to follow. As a result, one 
could not complain about the complexity of the information. However, be that as it 
may, a “simple and quick” bill comes with a number of challenges. For instance, it 
may exclude attention to detail. A simple example is that the bill was silent about 
project management. Furthermore, the necessary steps that need to be followed by 
policy makers - some were skipped because of the urgency and “uniqueness” of 
ARF Act. 
 Political debates 
Dunn [1994] and Dye [2007] agree that a mutual agreement has to be met and that 
setting of an agenda precedes the process of making a policy. If this is not the case, 
the stakeholders may try to push their own agenda [Eustis 2000]. The majority of 
respondents mutually agree that the heated debates on setting the agenda were 
healthy. Only two parties seemed to differ with the rest, which were the FF and 
ACDP. Their argument was the concern that the ANC government may create the 
ARF to serve their own personal interest. Respondent C described that the heated 
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debates “were very constructive not very antagonistic”. Although ACDP and FF were 
worried that government might use the fund for their personal interest, the rest were 
very supportive and they all reached consensus in the end. Nonetheless, the ANC 
government at the time was a majority and because the previous fund did not 
support development on the continent, the minority parties did not have the vote to 
influence the decision. Furthermore, they were in support of building relations with 
other countries and therefore agreed to the decision. 
 Participation of stakeholders 
Public officials, mass media, interest groups and bureaucracy, the president, 
parliament, the ministries and courts contribute in bringing issues to the policy 
agenda [Tosun, 2008]. When the respondents were asked who participated in 
development of the idea of ARF, they all spoke the same language. For instance, 
Respondent B said “Treasury and DIRCO”, while Respondent D mentioned that “It 
was us (DIRCO) and Treasury”. Respondent B added that “I think from government 
side there were different departments involved. It was DIRCO, presidency, the 
parliamentary committee and the department of finance and, I think those were the 
key stakeholders”. In general there is consensus that government was the key 
stakeholder in decision making. The findings at this stage reflect a lack of 
participation by civil society, mass media, and interest groups. Therefore, the 
majority of the society in SA is not aware of the existence of ARF. The participation 
of mass media would have publicised the establishment of the act to the general 
public and civil society would have brought other constructive contributions to the 
monitoring and evaluation, consultation and strategic direction. An absence of 
various groups and even the targeted group from African countries projects a lack of 
understanding in policy decision making process. 
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5.2.  DECISION MAKING/ALTERNATIVE POLICIES  
Consultation and co-ordination 
Consultation is key to successful policy implementation [Althaus, et al. 2013]. In 
general, it improves quality of the policy decisions through access to information and 
perspective [Freeman, 2013]. Policy consultation is important when an act is 
established. ARF operated slightly differently from other policies that have involved a 
lot of consultation. Because the act was targeted more “aggressively in advancing 
the African agenda”, there was a belief that it would be easy to amend. On the other 
hand, the process of establishing the act did not involve consultation outside 
government. Looking at UK, US, Africa and in other countries to compare knowledge 
and to be aware of how other countries have failed and succeeded in their policy 
making process would have been the best tool in preventing challenges of 
implementation of the act.  
 
Shepherd [2011] argues that better co-ordination in policy must contain three 
elements, i.e. strategic control from the centre of government, ministries with 
capacity for co-ordination and lastly, there must be a mechanism for a parallel co-
ordination. As a result, two problems have been identified that could impede effective 
performance in policy such as the growing size and complexity of government and 
coherence and control in policy [Shepherd, 2011]. It appears that DIRCO, ARF and 
Department of Finance (DF) were the main institutions that were involved in internal 
and external co-ordination when funds were disbursed. Nevertheless, concurrency 
as the act requires, was lacking. The absence of a DIRCO member when projects 
were run outside the country could lead to money not being used for the purpose for 
which it was paid. As long as the recipient country is not officially required to account 
for the funds received from DIRCO, ARF and DF, there is a possibility that funds will 
not be entirely utilised for economic, political and social development. There must be 
proper strategic control where there is coherence from the stage of submission of 
proposal until the development project is finished. This will improve the effectiveness 
of policy implementation.  
 
Smith [1997] and Tosun [2008] argue that formulation of policy directly deals with 
elaboration of alternatives of actions and encourages building on the policy 
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confidence. In addition, Halsworth [2011] and Barkenbus [1998] agree that policies 
brought closer to the real world and the real world closer to the policy process brings 
the added value of expert knowledge to increase policy space and enhances 
potential formulation of a win-win policy situation. This is one of the fundamentals in 
consulting on how experts choose the best practical policy from several alternatives. 
In ARF case, there was a lack of policy alternatives in establishing ARF. Only one 
policy was used as a basis which did not suit the values of a democratic government. 
This indicated a lack of knowledge in development aid policy which could lead to 
poor engagement for a good policy direction. 
5.3.  POLICY ADOPTION  
The condition of the budget puts more weight in the cabinet meeting, the lower the 
budget, the lower possibility for policy adoption [Subroto, 2011]. A clear and constant 
consultation for alternatives and criteria of the agenda ensures understanding, 
acceptance and legitimacy of the proposed policies [Freeman, 2013]. The previous 
amended economic loan fund had millions in the budget. There was no negative 
gesture in the cabinet for the adoption of ARF bill. On the other hand, because there 
was no other alternative to ARF which could have cost less or more than ARF, there 
was a common interest from the policy makers to adopt the bill into an Act with no 
financial challenges, and the balance of money from the previous fund made it easier 
for ARF Act to be adopted.  
 
5.4.  IMPLEMENTATION  
 Literature in policy implementation says logical choices, actors with capacity and 
access to knowledge, time, attention, are able to act logically when the act is put into 
action [Smith, 1997; Anderson, 2003]. It goes on stressing the importance of 
capacity with good leadership, and opportunity to adopt and proper implementation 
of policy is significant to ensure success of the policy [Halsworth, 2011; Smith, 1997; 
Tosun, 2008]. 
After the act became law, the interim committee did not have a strategic plan for the 
implementation; it was not part in the establishment process. Respondent F 
lamented “Immediately after the adoption of the act, tragedy started”. There were two 
teams to put the policy into action. The two teams rotated the posts. The first team 
had an idea of what is expected in operations and were armed with a strategic plan. 
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However, the second team did not know what to do. Policy makers raised the 
challenge of losing the ability to be innovative. The graph below shows the flow of 
funds from year 2000 to 2009.  
Fig.4 Source: [DIRCO, 2011] 
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The ARF has received funds from Treasury and assisted the African continent with 
donations for development. The Graph above shows funds donated to the African 
continent in US dollars from years 2000 to 2009. The funds donated were 
contributions for humanitarian assistance, technical co-operation and programs for 
human resources and administration costs for development. From 2000 to 2003 
there was a gradual increase in funding. However, from 2004 and 2005 there was a 
decline in fund assistance. From 2006, 2008 and 2009 the assistance in funding 
showed an increase in funding except 2007 which dropped about R282M. The 
declined in funding is the result of rejecting of project proposals which did not meet 
the requirements for funding [DIRCO, 2014], while the gradual increase in funding 
shows the proposal accepted by ARF because of meeting the ARF requirements. 
The fact that ARF started with millions of Rands led to it becoming big and unwieldy. 
The lack of innovation is the result of deficiency in access to knowledge, attention 
and logic. However, the department did send the teams to Norway for training during 
the implementation of the act. Conversely, a poor policy direction did not improve the 
implementation of the effectiveness of policy. The success of implementation 
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depends on how well bureaucratic structures implement goverment laws.  It was 
reported that the first team consisted of leadership and had an idea of what was 
expected but that the second team had less knowledge on policy implementation. As 
a result, the lack of opportunity for proper implementation of policy, led to poor   
implementation. 
 
Institutional capacity  
Institutions with sufficient resources are able to translate policy objectives into an 
operational framework and are accountable for their actions [Gerston, 2004, cited by 
Tosun, 2008].  
ARF did not have permanent staff that stayed in ARF. They borrowed personnel 
from DIRCO, to this day it does not have its own staff; they still depend on rotation of 
personnel. In addition, there is no project management team who are able to 
manage the administration of the fund. This showed weak institutional capacity. With 
the absence of permanent, skilled staff and experts, the translation of policy 
objectives into action becomes a challenge. In 2005, the AG raised concerns around 
governance issues involving motivation and encouragement of the culture of risk 
management, compliance to policies and procedures, and enhancement of the 
human resources function. Therefore, there was a lack of good governance and also 
poor capacity in human resources. 
 Reporting lines 
Hallsworth [2011] argues that the lack of realistic reporting processes leads policy in 
ad hoc solutions to problems. 
There is a lack of reporting on time frames. For instance, between when the project 
proposal is submitted, the time when money is disbursed by Treasury and the 
completion of the project there is no time allocated, although respondents stressed 
the importance of concurrency between Treasury and DIRCO ministry before 
approving the funds to be disbursed. This process is a tool of preventing one of the 
ministries in “cooking on itself and approving projects”. In addition, setting up of the 
ARF secretariat was “an afterthought”, “the money is disbursed and that’s it, who 
reports to whom afterwards......” said Respondent H. The policy makers reported that 
the system of reporting was introduced only two to three years ago. The project took 
longer than the expected time. “You will need a possibility of luck for that to happen” 
warned Respondent D. It was a challenge when a process was expected to run 
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according to a plan. A lack of a proper reporting structure has led the ARF institution 
to create an ad hoc approach to solutions. Thus, a realistic, coherent approach is 
needed to improve reporting structure.  
 Political influence 
Geoffrey [2011] claims that politicians can easily influence civil servants when they 
implement public policy. In addition, those who are administrators of policy are 
charged with the responsibility of carrying out the dictates of policy [Barkenbus, 
1998]. The implementers of policy have reported an insignificant political influence in 
implementation. Official 3 lamented “everything dealt with foreign policy resides with 
political influence”. Political influence was largely on foreign relations, where the 
president was the main facilitator. Power influence in government institutions 
remained a challenge in policy implementation, particularly in African countries 
where accountability is overlooked. The method by which reduction of political power 
can be applied, is in providing the embassy with independent authority in influencing 
development in the country that needs development assistance.   
 
5.5.  MONITORING AND EVALUATION  
According to Hallsworth [2011], Subroto [2011] and Tosun [2008], monitoring and 
evaluation leads to policy revision, it assesses policy objectives versus the achieved 
goals, it must be carried out by experts who are knowledgeable and understand the 
processes and objectives of the evaluation. In agreement, Barkenbus [1998], Tosun 
[2008] and Geoffrey [2011] mention that policy evaluation is most often a forgotten 
element; the two questions must be answered when evaluating policy, “how has the 
policy worked?” and “how can implementation of policy be improved?” The feedback 
will identify new problems that have arisen during the implementation process. This 
tendency explains the reason why evaluation is often ignored by decision makers. 
Evaluation of policy enables decision makers to draw lessons from the operation; 
that the growing size and complexity of government could become overwhelming to 
weak institutions and would impede successful policy results [Geoffrey, 2011].  
The challenges with ARF were that the process of forming the bill was simple; 
however, there was no M&E project management system in existence in the ARF. 
Therefore, there was no revision on how the implementation versus policy objectives 
had performed. A lack of experts and policy process also led to failure in creating an 
M&E system. Because this process was overlooked in policy decision making, it 
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explains the ignorance and lack of knowledge when Act 51 of 2000 was formed. 
Because of the monitoring and evaluation system, the growing size of ARF projects 
can incapacitate weak institutions and result in failure in policy objectives. 
 Governance Issues 
Literature stressed the importance of a system’s capacity and its good governance to 
be put as priority in the success of the policy process [Dunn, 1994; Smith, 1997]. 
Problems like the growing size and complexity of government, coherence and control 
in policy may result in impeding effective performance in policy [Shepherd, 2011].  
Issues of poor governance were raised by the AG in the annual reports dating from 
2005 to 2007. The AG has drawn attention to management capacity, strategic 
financial management, management reporting and culture of risk management, HR, 
compliance to policies and precedures were poorly reported. The fund did not have 
an effective monitoring, evaluation and reporting system on its performance in 
information, there were no time frames for the projects as required by the National 
Treasury Guide. For instance, the quality of the implementation and execution of 
adequate control and work procedures were not of an acceptable standard. As such, 
there was often reported evidence on non-conformity with prescribed internal 
controls and best practices. In addition, there was concern over significant 
weaknesses in controls. For example, the Auditor General called for the internal 
audit committee to ensure good governance in scheduling target dates for 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the planned and agreed KPIs. 
Formalising of the appropriate policies and procedures, strategic management of 
missions, co-ordination with departments and capacity building were important to 
ensure that planned targets were achieved at the end of the financial year. 
Management was encouraged to follow the PFMA procedures to improve the quality 
and content of monthly and quarterly management and performance reports. Risk 
management, human resources and compliance to policies and procedures are key 
to good governance. These were issues of governance in running the ARF. These 
issues prevailed because of poor capacity in strategic direction which requires good 
leadership, capacitated human resources and a strong institution with prioritised 
systems of control [DIRCO, 2005; 2007] . 
 Accountability 
Government institutions have a responsibility to introduce order where appropriate 
and holding implementers to account when something goes wrong [Halsworth, 
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2011]. Anticipation of challenges in decision making processes must provide 
transparency, accountability and opportunities for involvement [Freeman, 2013]. 
During the interviews with policy makers at DIRCO, the good intentions of the policy 
were highlighted. While they all raised concerns about the silence of the act in 
accountability during its implementation, they all agreed that one of the challenges in 
its operation came about in administration and during reporting. As a result, the ANC 
conference in 2009 started to discuss solutions on how to close this gap. 
Respondent E said “I mean giving funds of R100M and all of that, is a lot of money 
so you need to account for it how, you got to follow the money and account” 
 
There is a need to review the act as a matter of urgency. The act was “short 
sighted”, it did not have a long term and a short term goal. As a result, 
implementation of the policy suffered. Had it been reviewed in the short term, the 
issue of accountability would have been noticed, a strategy to close this gap would 
have been put in place to prevent future unaccountability in its operation. 
 
5.6.  ENABLERS AND CONSTRAINTS 
The African Renaissance fund objective of supporting other countries in the 
continent continued to exist. However, South Africa itself has its own challenges 
which include its administration, governance issues and human resources. Below 
are enablers and constraints highlighted by policy makers from ARF. 
 67 
 
 
Constraints 
 Issues of accountability   
 The  temptation to be used as a state fund  for the political interest 
 Institutional framework not simple  
 No autonomy for officials 
 Absence of monitoring and evaluation 
 No record keeping and  knowledge  
 Influence of political power  
 Difficult administration system for emergencies 
 No timelines  
 No project management.  
 No ability to be creative and supportive 
 No strategic plan 
 
 
Enablers 
 Budget availability 
 An advisory committee 
 The embassies  
 Simple legislation  
 Regulations of public sector 
 
 
 
Looking at the above factors, although ARF have enabling tools to implement the 
policy, the constraints far outweigh the enablers. With so many constraints 
mentioned above, it will be difficult to achieve the objectives of the policy. This 
reflects the poor policy framework when the ARF act was established. The 
constraints are the weaknesses in running the fund. 
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5.7.  SUGGESTIONS FROM POLICY MAKERS  
 
 An independent board to evaluate the projects or the project manager and  a 
proper guide to guide the independent board; 
 A monitoring and evaluation report and a record kept for all projects in an   
e - booklet format to be processed in a website;  
 SADPA is the answer, a fully pledged developing agency and full time 
employees for SADPA; 
 Public officials to follow what PFMA says and private service providers to 
agree with these rules; 
 High level skilled project managers and project management and, lastly, 
 ARF should allocate one of its people authority to make decisions  and  
provide inspectors  with proper mechanisms for implementation 
A lack of co-ordination and information   sharing in ARF led to poor performance 
in policy implementation. 
 
5.8.  CONCLUSION  
The chapter analysed the data that was presented in the previous chapter. The 
literature review was linked to what the policy makers said in context related to 
setting the agenda, Policy formulation and alternatives, Policy adoption, Policy 
implementation and Monitoring and Evaluation of Policy. The policy making process 
in which data was analysed used Dunn’s [1994] policy making cycle tool with which 
the ARF findings were analysed. 
The Department of International Relations and Co-operation’s objective is to govern 
the foreign affairs of South Africa. African Renaissance and the international co-
operation fund within DIRCO holds the development aid foreign policy for DIRCO. 
However, after an intensive review of ARF from 2000 to 2009, it was discovered that 
it had administrative, human resource and project management challenges to 
achieve its mandate of implementing act 51 of 2000. The new agency (SADPA) is 
expected to counter all the challenges suffered by ARF. However, ARF institutional 
capacity was found to be weak, as a result it impacted on the implementation policy 
process.   
The next chapter provides a conclusion for this study and recommendations in order 
to capacitate the establishment of the new agency (SADPA).   
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CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
6.1.  INTRODUCTION  
The research problem stated in this research report was that the development aid 
policy of South Africa is inconsistent, not well co-ordinated, lacks proper 
implementing mechanisms and often diverts from policy objectives. The aim of the 
study was to explore the policy process leading to the establishment of ARF, Act 51 
of 2000, from 2000 to 2009, with the intention of adding more knowledge of public 
policy decision making processes. In order to provide answers to the aim of the 
report, the main question of what the policy process was that led to the 
establishment of ARF was asked with its sub-questions. Recommendations are 
made to help DIRCO in developing a strategic direction on how they will close the 
gap in the weakness of the foreign policy making process. 
 
The first, second, third and fourth chapters provided a theoretical viewpoint on the 
policy decision making process. Using policy concepts and frameworks from the 
previous chapters on how the act becomes law, from the viewpoint of different 
scholars, it was found that there is a body of literature applicable to the research 
problem. Dunn’s policy process was used for the analysis of ARF policy process. His 
policy cycle model was used in chapter five to reach the findings of this study. 
Recommendation for the SADPA policy making process is given below. 
 
6.2.  RECOMMENDATIONS  
The weakness in incapacitated institutions, barriers in implementation and lack of 
strategic direction is a result of poor decision making process in policy. The 
deficiency in proper consultation and rushing into establishing an act has deprived 
policy makers of an opportunity to see how other development aid policies are 
formed. The constraints in policy implementation such as issues of accountability, 
political influence, absence of monitoring and evaluation, poor human resource 
management, and a strategic plan need knowledgeable leadership and skills to 
remedy. Implementation is an act of putting policy into action, conversely, it is normal 
to observe a gap in what was planned and what actually occurred as a result of 
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policy [Buse, et al. 2005]. It is the researcher’s opinion that in putting the act into 
action, the root of the problem lies in a weak policy process followed in the 
establishment of the act. Following what appeared to be poor policy making process 
in ARF, the following recommendations are suggested: 
 Strategic plan 
There must be a strategic plan that is forward looking, detailed for how the 
implementation should be done with time frames, the right skilled employees with 
target and actual performance indicators. 
 Participation of stakeholders 
Public officials, mass media, interest groups and bureaucracy, the president, 
parliament, the ministries and courts contribute in bringing issues to the policy 
agenda [Tosun, 2008]. There is a lack of participation by civil society, mass media, 
and interested groups. Therefore lack of various groups and even the targeted group 
from African countries projects a lack of understanding in policy decision making 
processes. At the initiation stage, various stakeholders should be involved to ensure 
contribution of experts throughout the policy process. 
 Human Resources 
Education and training should be provided for employees of SADPA. A permanent 
team for SADPA should be hired and offered education and training about the 
foreign aid policy. Employees should be rewarded when they have delivered 
according to expectations and beyond. This will motivate them and improve 
implementation of the policy. 
An easy to follow manual/booklet for officials should be given to each employee of 
SADPA with the objectives of the policy. The booklet should have important 
information on how the policy is put into action. There must be people working within 
the teams available to interpret the implementation process. Autonomy should be 
delegated to embassies so that they can make decisions without political influence. 
They must also have an alternative system where there are emergency projects. All 
the above will improve service delivery. 
 Project Management 
There should be a contract management in place who are experts in development 
aid. Three people are needed. The first one should be the one who leads the whole 
team in project management; the second one should be the one who sees that the 
 71 
 
projects run on time and the technicalities of running these. The third person should 
be an independent person that monitors and evaluates various stages of the project. 
 Accountability 
Information communication technology systems must be adopted that record the 
funding process from the proposal stage to the monitoring and evaluation stage. This 
will help to ensure that the money disbursed to projects has been utilised for the 
purpose intended. Timelines should be allocated for the running of the project. This 
will assist in recording how long such projects take to finish so that estimations can 
be done for similar projects. 
 Reporting Channels 
There should be clear reporting lines from the project proposal to the monitoring and 
evaluation stage. 
A good supporting system from management must be available to help those who 
get stuck in the process implementing the policy. 
 Monitoring and evaluation 
There should be a monitoring and evaluation team within SADPA to check the 
progress and completion of the project and the problems encountered to be handled 
within the time frame. 
 Regulations 
Regulations of PFMA, DPSA and the constitution should be observed. This will 
improve good governance in DIRCO. The personnel should attend workshops and 
be made aware of the regulations of these institutions to strengthen the foreign 
development aid policy. 
 Consultation and Co-ordination 
Consultation in policy discussion and the decision making process balances the 
formation of a good policy. However, the lack of consultation and co-ordination in 
ARF led to poor decision making.  
 
CONCLUSION  
The aim of this study was to explore the policy making process of ARF with the 
purpose of adding more knowledge in policy decision making processes, with the 
use of primary and secondary data gathered to highlight the strengths and 
weaknesses in the ARF policy making process. This research study has discussed 
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the conclusion based on the knowledge gap, the views of the policy makers and the 
findings. The research offers recommendations to DIRCO policy makers. 
The act was enacted in 2000 and has many loopholes. It is time to revisit the act and 
make necessary adjustments where the act is silent or lack details. Credit must be 
given to the dedicated policy makers who put this act together and implemented it for 
the development of the African continent. It is critical to do stock taking to unpack the 
success and failures of act 51 of 2000 in order to improve policy implementation in 
future. 
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APPENDICES  
APPENDIX A:  INTERVIEW GUIDE  
The interview process started with an Introduction whereby the researcher 
introduces herself and the topic and continued with warm up questions. This paved 
the way for the research questions to be asked. 
 
Purpose of Research 
The purpose of this research was to explore the policy process leading to the 
establishment of ARF bill from 2000 to 2009. 
 
1. Would you kindly narrate the policy processes that have been followed by the 
South African government in the making of the ARF Bill between 2000 and 2009? 
 Probe: Has the process been as intensive/transparent/ objective/constructive 
as it should be? 
 Probe: If yes: Would you kindly describe the processes 
 Probe: If not: What would you recommend should be done 
 
2. What steps are being taken by the South African government in improving its 
development policy aid through the ARF Bill? 
 
3. In your view, what policy model has been adopted in the Bill’s deliberations  
 
Probe: Is it viable in strengthening policy weaknesses which haunted ARF? 
 
 
4. What steps would you recommend need to be taken by government to ensure 
a credible and acceptable policy making process in the drafting of the bill? 
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APPENDIX 1[A] 
TECHNICAL INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
POLICY AGENDA  
 Why Act 51 of 2000 was establishment? 
 What was the political discussion around the ARF policy? 
 Were there any particular policy process followed in establishment of the bill? 
 If any, will you break them out please? 
 Were there any challenges encountered in making of the bill? 
 What different parties say about policy before decision is made? 
 What are the different points of view, assumptions and contradictions? 
 Who were the actors involved and what were their views? 
POLICY FORMULATION  
 Did power influence the choice of policy alternative? 
 Were the people involved in choosing the right policy alternative 
knowledgeable? 
 How did the policy formulation take place? 
POLICY ADOPTION  
 What role has civil society actually played in ARF? 
 How has policy changed over time? 
 Give me a brief overview of how adoption of policy takes place? 
IMPLEMENTATION  
 What institutions are involved in implementation? 
 How are responsibilities divided? 
 Is policy efficiently implemented? 
 Are there enough resources? 
 Is the institution capable of achieving the objectives of the policy? 
 Does political power influence implementation?  
 Is there room for interpretation on implementation level? 
 Who are the people to be served? 
 Is the implementation programme easy to follow? 
 Did you have any challenges in budget provided?  
 Are the personnel in place with the right qualification? 
 Is the technical equipment and infrastructure enough to run the programs? 
 Is there any difficulties arising in reporting? 
 How is the reporting line? 
 Are the responsible managers supportive? 
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 Do you think there were any challenges in implementing the bill? 
EVALUATION AND MONITORING  
 What measures were put in place in evaluating the policy? 
 Has policy been effective? 
 What are the enabling and constraining factors? 
 Where are the problems situated, in what phase? 
 What has been done so far to fix the problems? 
 Has the output of policy attained the intended goals? 
 Do you have any recommendations how things should be done to improve 
service delivery? 
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APPENDIX B:  LIST OF INTERVIEWEES  
 
The following policy makers formed part of the interviews: 
 
Name Title Date of interview 
      
1. Mr. Short Director 01-Jul-14 
      
2. Mr. A. Moodley Former Chartered accountant 03-Jul-14 
      
3. Mr.  S. Maqungo Former Advocate 18-Jul-14 
      
4.Dr. A. Ntsaluba Former Director General 23-Jul-14 
      
5. Ms S. Rubushe Director and Secretary 02-Aug-14 
      
6. 3 X Public 
officials 1x Deputy Director 06-Aug-14 
NB: Anonymous 2x Assistant Directors 15-Aug-14 
 
 
